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I. AN INTRODUCTION TO CLAIM AND ISSUE PRECLUSION
A. Introduction
The doctrine of res judicata describes a set of rules which determine 
the preclusive effects of a final judgment on the merits.  The California 
doctrine has two familiar components: A primary aspect, “res judicata” 
or claim preclusion; and a secondary aspect, “collateral estoppel” or 
issue preclusion.1 Under the claim preclusion aspect, a prior judgment 
bars the parties or their privies from relitigating the “same cause of 
action” in a subsequent proceeding.2  Under the issue preclusion aspect, 
although a second suit between the same parties on a different cause of
action is not wholly barred by a prior judgment, the first judgment 
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law.  B.A., 1968, 
University of Michigan; J.D., 1971, Universitiy of Wisconsin; LL.M. 1978, Harvard Law 
School. 
1. Court decisions and legal commentators often do not distinguish between the 
two aspects of the doctrine, and refer generally to them as “res judicata.” See People v.
Sims, 651 P.2d 321, 326 n. 6 (Cal. 1982) (noting this observation).  In this Article, “res 
judicata” will be used as a reference to the overall doctrine encompassing both 
preclusion aspects, and “claim preclusion” will be used in its obvious narrow sense. No
such confusion attends “collateral estoppel” and “issue preclusion,” and these terms are
used interchangeably in this Article.
2. See, e.g., Agarwal v. Johnson, 603 P.2d 58, 72 (Cal. 1979); Slater v. 
Blackwood, 543 P.2d 593, 594 (Cal. 1975). 
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operates as a conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second
action as were “actually litigated and determined” in the prior 
proceeding.3 
This Article discusses two related problems regarding the scope of the
collateral estoppel doctrine applied by the California courts. Both
problems concern the determination of whether issues were “actually
litigated and determined” by a prior judgment.  Both implicate the 
tension between the desire to achieve judicial economy on the one hand, 
and the right of a party to a fair opportunity for a full adversary hearing 
on an issue on the other. The next section of Part I examines the policies
underlying the preclusion doctrines, and explains how clear issue 
preclusion rules applied in an underinclusive manner further these 
policies. Part I then briefly describes California’s current claim 
preclusion doctrine as background to the collateral estoppel problems 
discussed in Part II.4 
Part II begins with an explanation of the basic requirements of 
California collateral estoppel doctrine, as well as the impact of public 
policies and fairness concerns on these basic requirements.  Part II then 
examines various judicial interpretations of what issues are precluded 
under this seemingly straightforward “actually litigated and determined” 
rule, and demonstrates how they are facially inconsistent and confusing. 
Part III concludes with some suggestions to correct the confusing and 
unpredictable nature of California’s current issue preclusion doctrine. 
The main recommendations are that the California Supreme Court must
adhere more faithfully to the issue preclusion standards of the 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments, and must apply collateral estoppel 
in an underinclusive manner. 
B. 	 Judicial Economy and the Need for Clear Issue Preclusion Rules 
Applied in an Underinclusive Manner 
The California doctrine of res judicata is largely the product of judge-
3. See Sims, 651 P.2d at 331; Lucido v. Superior Court, 795 P.2d 1223, 1225 n. 3
(Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 920 (1991). 
4. In a related article entitled California’s Unpredictable Res Judicata (Claim 
Preclusion) Doctrine, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 559 (1998) [hereinafter Heiser, Res 
Judicata], Professor Heiser discusses the uncertain and unpredictable claim preclusion
rules currently applied by the California courts, and recommends that the California 
Supreme Court jettison these rules and replace them with those of the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS (1982).  The instant Article contains a very basic description of 
California’s claim preclusion doctrine, and of the primary rights theory upon which the 
current doctrine is based, as background to the problems of issue preclusion discussed
herein.  For an extended discussion of the problems associated with California’s claim
preclusion doctrine, see Heiser, Res Judicata, supra this note.
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made law.5 In developing this doctrine, the courts have sought to 
promote various efficiency notions, commonly referred to as judicial 
economy. The California Supreme Court has offered two related
reasons for the claim preclusion aspect of res judicata: “(1) That the
defendant should be protected against vexatious litigation; and (2) that it 
is against public policy to permit litigants to consume the time of the 
courts by re-litigating matters already judicially determined, or by 
asserting claims which properly should have been settled in some prior
action.”6  More specifically with respect to issue preclusion, the Court 
has identified the public policies underlying collateral estoppel as 
“preservation of the integrity of the judicial system, promotion of
judicial economy, and protection of litigants from harassment by 
vexatious litigation.”7  Although the policy reasons for these two 
preclusion doctrines sound similar, they play a much more direct role in
issue preclusion determinations than they do in claim preclusion
decisions.8 
5. The California Supreme Court developed the claim and the issue preclusion
components of res judicata over the course of several years.  See, e.g., Lucido, 795 P.2d
at 1225-32 (identifying threshold requirements and defining public policy considerations 
for issue preclusion); Sims, 651 P.2d at 326-30 (extending res judicata principles to
administrative proceedings); Bernhard v. Bank of America, 122 P.2d 892, 894-95 (Cal. 
1942) (rejecting the mutuality doctrine as a requirement of collateral estoppel); Slater, 
543 P.2d at 594-97 (distinguishing primary rights from theories of recovery for claim
preclusion purposes). 
Although the basic res judicata doctrine has never been codified, a few statutes do help
define the rules.  See e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 99 (Deering 1991) (limiting the
collateral estoppel effect of municipal court judgments to other litigation between the
same parties); Id. § 1047 (Deering 1996) (authorizing successive actions on same 
contract); Id. § 1049 (Deering 1996) (providing that an action is deemed pending until 
final determination on appeal); Id. § 1062 (Deering 1996) (providing that a declaratory
relief judgment shall not preclude a party from obtaining additional relief on the same 
facts); Id. §§ 1908-1912 (Deering 1996) (defining various effects of a final judgment); 
Id. §§ 426.10 & 426.30 (Deering 1995) (defining compulsory cross-complaints). 
6. See Wulfjen v. Dolton, 151 P.2d 846, 848 (Cal. 1944).  See also Panos v. Great 
W. Packing Co., 134 P.2d 242, 243 (Cal. 1943).  For a thorough discussion of the
various policies underlying res judicata, see Robert Ziff, Note, For One Litigant’s Sole
Relief: Unforeseeable Preclusion and the Second Restatement, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 
910-23 (1992) [hereinafter Unforeseeable Preclusion]. See also Heiser, Res Judicata, 
supra note 4.
7. Lucido, 795 P.2d at 1227. 
8. See infra notes 74-86 and accompanying text. The courts refer to the policy 
reasons for claim preclusion as background justification for that doctrine’s sometimes 
harsh effect. See, e.g., Wulfjen, 151 P.2d at 848; Panos, 134 P.2d at 243; Slater, 543 
P.2d at 596. In contrast, the courts utilize the public policies underlying issue preclusion
as an integral component of that doctrine.  See, e.g., Lucido, 795 P.2d at 1229-32, and 
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A successful res judicata doctrine furthers judicial economy in both a 
substantive and an administrative manner.  The substantive goal of the 
claim preclusion component, for example, is to define what rights are 
extinguished by a final judgment such that parties are barred from 
pursuing multiple lawsuits to resolve disputes which could have been 
resolved in one proceeding. Substantive efficiency is achieved through
the definition of the “claim” foreclosed by a prior judgment.  A
definition broad in scope as to what rights are extinguished obviously
furthers the goal of barring subsequent litigation more effectively than a 
less inclusive one.  The California courts, by employing the primary
rights theory of claim preclusion, have opted for a narrow view of what 
substantive rights are extinguished by a judgment.9  Consequently, by
definitional design the California claim preclusion doctrine contains a 
fundamental diseconomy—one which sometimes permits parties to
litigate aspects of a unitary controversy in two or more lawsuits even
though they could have otherwise presented their entire dispute in one. 
This substantive inefficiency, curious in a time of great concern over 
excessive litigation and limited judicial resources, has caused many 
commentators to strongly criticize California’s claim preclusion doctrine 
and call for its revision.10  As will be discussed later in this Article, this
substantive inefficiency in California’s claim preclusion doctrine may
have influenced the manner in which the California courts apply the 
issue preclusion doctrine. 
With respect to the rules of issue preclusion, the opportunity to
achieve substantive efficiency is limited because their application occurs
infra text accompanying notes 74-86. 
9. For a brief description of the primary rights theory see infra notes 22-48 and
accompanying text.  For a more complete discussion, see Heiser, Res Judicata, supra
note 4.
10. Robin James, Comment, Res Judicata: Should California Abandon Primary 
Rights?, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 351 (1989) [hereinafter Abandon Primary Rights],
contains an excellent discussion of the ambiguities in California’s claim preclusion 
doctrine and of its substantive diseconomies, and concludes that California should 
abandon it reliance on the primary rights doctrine.  Additional analysis and a similar
recommendation, with emphasis on the administrative as well as the substantive 
inefficiencies of California’s current claim preclusion doctrine, appear in Heiser, Res 
Judicata, supra note 4.
As early as 1947, legal scholars have discussed the problems associated with the
definition of a cause of action based on the primary rights theory, and have advocated
adoption of a less vague and more economical standard for res judicata purposes.  See, 
See See e.g., CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 130-40 (2d 
ed. 1947); Comment, Cause of Action Broadened in California, 1 STAN. L. REV. 156
(1948); Arlo E. Smith, Comment, Res Judicata in California, 40 CAL. L. REV. 412, 414-
19 (1952); Jack H. Friedenthal, Joinder of Claims, Counterclaims, and Cross-
Complaints: Suggested Revision of the California Provisions, 23 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1970);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 cmt. a (1982). 
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only when consecutive litigation is permitted by the rules of claim 
preclusion. In other words, collateral estoppel is a less significant
vehicle for attaining judicial economy than is claim preclusion because,
by definition, collateral estoppel only applies when claim preclusion 
does not wholly bar subsequent litigation between parties.11 
Nevertheless, the rules of issue preclusion are important to parties 
because they define the scope of the factual and legal matters that may
be relitigated in subsequent proceedings. 
Courts may achieve some measure of substantive efficiency through 
collateral estoppel by a broad view of what constitutes an issue “actually
litigated and determined” in a prior proceeding.  But even this potential 
substantive efficiency is limited.  If a court’s view is too broad, it may be 
contrary to the other efficiency goals of collateral estoppel. For 
example, if the definition of issues “actually litigated” were broad 
enough to include issues which could have been but were not actually
raised, then parties may feel compelled to over-litigate issues in the first
action.12  Any potential savings in judicial time and resources 
11. In Rex R. Perschbacher, Rethinking Collateral Estoppel: Limiting the 
Preclusive Effect of Administrative Determinations in Judicial Proceedings, 35 U. FLA.
L. REV. 422, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 422, 445-51 (1983), Professor Perschbacher examines
the policy rationales typically stated for claim preclusion—finality of judicial decisions,
protection of litigants from the expense and vexation of multiple suits, and conservation
of judicial resources—and concludes they do not support expansive applications of issue 
preclusion.  Professor Perschbacher reasons that whereas the goal of judicial economy is 
a main justification for claim preclusion, it has only partial application to issue 
preclusion:
By banning relitigation of a claim regardless of new evidence, new theories of 
recovery or defense, or arguments that the first suit was wrongly decided, res 
judicata enforces finality in the judicial system.  Collateral estoppel, on the 
other hand, has never prevented relitigation in this wholesale way.  By
definition, a second action on a different claim has already begun.  The issues 
in the first action must actually have been litigated and determined.  Since only
the number of issues, not necessarily the number of cases, is reduced, any time
savings is on a smaller scale. 
Id. at 448-49 (footnotes omitted). 
12. This potential for inefficient over-litigation is recognized in the comments to
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS. The Introductory Note to the sections on 
issue preclusion discusses some of the problems associated with an overly-broad
application of the issue preclusion doctrine, and advises “if a party is aware of the 
potential (and perhaps not wholly foreseeable) preclusive effects of a judgment, he may
feel compelled to over-litigate an issue, or to pursue an appeal that might not otherwise 
be taken, out of fear of the consequences in later litigation.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 27, intro. note (1982).  If preclusive effect were given to issues not 
actually litigated, “the result might serve to discourage compromise, to decrease the
likelihood that the issues in an action would be narrowed by stipulation, and thus to
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attributable to an overly-broad preclusion rule may therefore be offset by 
similar expenditures by over-litigation. 
The administrative goal of any res judicata doctrine is to provide clear
rules, predictable in their application and foreseeable in their
consequences, which will eliminate unnecessary litigation and do so in a 
fair manner.  Regardless of whether the chosen preclusion standard is a 
substantively broad or narrow one, both the claim and the issue 
preclusion rules should be easy to understand and to administer.
Clear, predictable collateral estoppel rules promote efficient judicial 
administration in a variety of related ways.  First, they inform parties as 
to what matters they must pursue in their initial lawsuit or forever be 
foreclosed, and thereby assure the litigants that the resolution of these 
matters will be final and conclusive.13  Clear issue preclusion rules
provide a degree of predictability which allow parties to structure their 
litigation conduct with some assurance as to when that conduct will and 
will not foreclose presentation of issues in a subsequent proceeding. 
Conversely, uncertain rules may be both inefficient and unfair.  Unfair 
intensify litigation.”  Id. at § 27 cmt.  e.  A similar  observation appears in Alan N. 
Polasky, Collateral Estoppel—Effects of Prior Litigation, 39 IOWA L. REV. 217 (1954):
“[A]ny tendency to extend the conclusive effects of matters previously adjudicated might
easily tend to intensify the effort expended in the initial litigation and might increase the 
probability of resort to appeal . . . .” Id. at 220. 
Other commentators have noted this over-litigation phenomenon as well. In
Unforeseeable Preclusion, supra note 6, at 917, the author discusses unnecessary
litigation as a cost of overly-broad res judicata rules which force litigants into a wasteful 
“use it or lose it” mentality: “[I]f litigants fear that courts will apply issue preclusion to 
any tangential issue mentioned at trial, they might contest even trivial matters that they
would otherwise only mention in passing.  Litigation of these collateral matters may be 
especially costly, since it can greatly increase the complexity of the suit.”  Id. at 918. 
Professor Perschbacher astutely observes: 
In many situations, no time or expense will be saved through application
of collateral estoppel.  If collateral estoppel effects are foreseeable in advance, 
the parties will likely litigate the first action with an eye towards related future 
actions.  Hence, impending application of collateral estoppel encourages the
parties to expend more resources litigating the issue in the first action.  In 
every instance, additional time and expense must be invested in litigating the
new question of whether to apply collateral estoppel in the second action . . . .
Perschbacher, supra note 11, at 449 (footnotes omitted).
13. For an excellent discussion of the problems caused by unpredictable preclusion 
rules generally, see Unforeseeable Preclusion, supra note 6; see also Heiser, Res
Judicata, supra note 4; Abandon Primary Rights, supra note 10, at 407-10.  In
Unforeseeable Preclusion, the author discusses the costs associated with unforeseeable 
preclusion in light of the various policies underlying res judicata—fairness to litigants, 
repose through finality of judgments, reliance on and accuracy of judgments, and
efficient allocation of judicial resources. See id. at 910-27. From this, the author
concludes that to be more foreseeable, the preclusion laws must be both clear and
underinclusive: “[T]he proper model of res judicata law is, whenever possible, to 
establish clear rules, with some flexible exceptions used in rare cases, that serve only to
block, but never to invoke, preclusion in unforeseeable situations.”  Id. at 927. 
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because they may discourage some parties from presenting issues in an
initial proceeding in the mistaken belief that these matters may be 
pursued in subsequent litigation. Inefficient because they may compel
other parties to over-litigate an issue or to pursue an appeal that might
not otherwise be taken, or to forgo compromise or stipulation, out of fear 
of the consequences in later litigation.14  In this regard, unclear issue 
preclusion rules create the same problems of over-litigation as do overly-
broad definitions of the issue foreclosed by prior litigation.15  Parties 
cannot know what issues they must raise to avoid preclusion unless they 
know what the preclusion rules require them to raise. 
Second, a predictable collateral estoppel doctrine will not only bar 
relitigation of issues in successive proceedings, but should also minimize 
disagreements over what issues are barred.  Uncertain preclusion rules
undermine this efficiency goal, and may embroil the court and the 
parties in protracted litigation over the issue preclusive effects of a prior 
judgment that clearer rules would have discouraged.16  Litigation over
the question of whether a prior judgment has an issue preclusive effect,
caused by unclear rules, may consume more time and resources in a
subsequent proceeding than will be saved by the preclusive effect of the 
rules once determined applicable.17 
Balanced against the goals of substantive and administrative 
efficiency is, of course, a party’s right to be heard on the merits of her
claims.  Due process safeguards a litigant’s right to a full and fair
opportunity to procedurally, substantively, and evidentially pursue an
issue; but collateral estoppel does not afford a litigant more than one
opportunity for such judicial resolution.18  The tension between the 
14. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 intro. note & cmt. e (1982). 
15. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
16. See Unforeseeable Preclusion, supra note 6, at 917-18 & 923. 
17. See id. at 917-918; Perschbacher, supra note 11, at 449.  As explained in
Unforeseeable Preclusion, unclear res judicata rules impose an unnecessary litigation 
cost concerning the very issue of preclusion:
Res judicata must be administrable without a long and expensive inquiry
into the nature of the prior suit, because having a trial to avoid a trial would be
senseless. Similarly, if a formulation of res judicata invites litigants to file
preclusion motions with little chance of success, the cost of unsuccessful 
motions for preclusion may outweigh the trial time saved by the successful 
motions. 
Unforeseeable Preclusion, supra note 6, at 917 (footnotes omitted). 
18. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 
329-33 (1971); Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979); Hansberry v. Lee,
311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940); see also People v. Sims, 651 P.2d 321, 329 (Cal. 1982) (ruling
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desire to achieve judicial economy and the party’s right to one full and 
fair adversary hearing on an issue is implicit whenever a court
determines a collateral estoppel question.  This tension comes to the
forefront, however, when the proper application of the doctrine is not 
readily apparent because the issue preclusion rules are unclear. 
In such circumstances the concern for fairness, as well as for the goal 
of efficient judicial administration, should win out over the desire for 
substantive efficiency.19  In other words, for example, where the proper 
application of the issues “actually litigated and determined” rule is 
unclear, a court should apply this rule in an underinclusive manner. 
Underinclusion in this context means that when the proper application of
this issue preclusion rule is in doubt, the court should decline to invoke
the rule in a manner that would bar litigation of matters not clearly
precluded. An underinclusive approach in such circumstances not only 
safeguards a party’s right to a full and fair hearing, but also conserves 
judicial and litigant resources which otherwise would be expended in the
resolution of close questions of issue preclusion.  The optimal definition 
of the issue “actually litigated and determined” for collateral estoppel
purposes, therefore, is one whose scope is both clear and underinclusive. 
C. A Brief But Necessary Summary of California’s      

Claim Preclusion Doctrine 

1. The Primary Rights Doctrine 

The doctrine of res judicata precludes parties or persons in privity20 
that party to be collaterally estopped by prior agency decision must have been provided 
an adequate opportunity to fully present claims during administrative hearing); Vella v.
Hudgins, 572 P.2d 28, 31 (Cal. 1977) (quoting In re Crow, 483 P.2d 1206, 1213 (Cal. 
1971)) (ruling that the doctrine of res judicata, whether applied as a total bar to further 
litigation or as collateral estoppel, “rests upon the sound policy of limiting litigation by
preventing a party who has had one fair adversary hearing on an issue from again
drawing it into controversy”). 
19. When preclusion rules are unclear and therefore preclusion is unpredictable, 
the goals of fairness and efficiency are undermined.  See Unforeseeable Preclusion, 
supra note 6, at 923.  “Penalizing someone for failing to follow unforeseeable rules of
preclusion is fundamentally unfair, because penalties are unjustified unless the doctrine
‘conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by
common understanding and practices.’”  Id. at 922-23 (quoting United States v. Petrillo, 
332 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947)).  Moreover, if the circumstances under which a court will apply
preclusion are unclear, two kinds of inefficient litigation will result: First, threshold 
litigation over the propriety of preclusion will increase substantially; and second, risk-
adverse litigants will overlitigate collateral issues for fear of being precluded later.  See 
id. at 923. 
20. The concept of “privity” refers to certain limited circumstances where a
person, although not a party, is bound by a judgment because of some specific 
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with them from relitigating the same cause of action that has been finally 
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction.  In other words, a single
“cause of action” cannot be split and made the subject of separate 
lawsuits.21  Of central importance to any doctrine of claim preclusion, 
therefore, is the definition of “cause of action.” 
The California courts define a “cause of action” by reference to the 
primary rights theory developed by Professor John Norton Pomeroy in 
the nineteenth century.22  According to Pomeroy, a “cause of action” 
consists of a “primary right” possessed by the plaintiff, a corresponding 
“primary duty” of the defendant, and a wrongful act by the defendant 
constituting a breach of that duty.23  The California Supreme Court
relationship with the party and where the nonparty’s interests were adequately
represented by the  party. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 34-61 (1982);
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1908(a) & (b) (Deering Supp. 1998); Clemmer v. Hartford Ins. 
Co., 587 P.2d 1098 (Cal. 1978) (expanding concept of privity beyond traditional
applications to any relationship between the party to be precluded and the unsuccessful 
party in the prior litigation which is “sufficiently close” so as to justify application of res
judicata). See infra note 73 for additional discussion of the California doctrine of privity.
21. See Wulfjen v. Dolton, 151 P.2d 846, 848 (Cal. 1944); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 18 & 19 (1982). 
22. See, e.g., Agarwal v. Johnson, 603 P.2d 58, 72 (Cal. 1979); Slater v. 
Blackwood, 543 P.2d 593, 594 (Cal. 1975); Holmes v. David H. Bricker, Inc., 452 P.2d
647, 649 (Cal. 1969). 
John Norton Pomeroy (1828-1885) was a professor at the Hastings College of Law 
during the nineteenth century, and a prolific legal scholar.  In addition to his influential 
multi-volume treatise on equity jurisprudence and equitable remedies, in which he
explained at length the primary rights theory of a cause of action, see infra notes 23 and
30; Professor Pomeroy also published treatises on a wide variety of topics, including the 
civil procedure in California and other states, code pleading and remedies, constitutional 
law, municipal law, wills and trusts, and western water law.
23. See  JOHN NORTON POMEROY, REMEDIES AND REMEDIAL RIGHTS § 453, at 487
(Little, Brown, & Co. 1876) [hereinafter POMEROY, REMEDIES]; JOHN NORTON POMEROY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 91 at 76 (A.L. Bancroft & Co. 1881) [hereinafter POMEROY,
EQUITY]. Professor Pomeroy observed that although the American courts had repeatedly
distinguished a “cause of action” from the relief demanded in a case before them, “they
have not attempted to define the term ‘cause of action’ in any general and abstract 
manner, so that this definition might be used as a test in all other cases.”  POMEROY,
REMEDIES, supra, § 452, at 486. Pomeroy then undertook to define the correct meaning 
of the term “cause of action,” apparently relying on natural law concepts.  See id. at 486-
87. 
Professor Pomeroy also undertook the onerous task of identifying all the rules which
constitute “private civil law” and assigning them to mutually exclusive classes of 
primary rights and duties. POMEROY, EQUITY, supra, §§ 89-95, at 75-79.  According to
Pomeroy, all such rights fell naturally into two grand divisions: those relating to
“Persons” and those concerned with “Things.” Id. at 77.  The first of these divisions 
comprised “only those rules the exclusive object of which is to define the status of 
persons.” Id. at 77.
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adopted the primary rights approach to claim preclusion as early as 
1887,24 and still adheres to that approach today.25 
Under the California primary rights theory, the invasion of one 
primary right gives rise to a single cause of action.26  The most salient 
characteristic of a primary right is that it is indivisible: The violation of a 
single primary right gives rise to but one cause of action which cannot 
be split and made the subject of separate lawsuits.27  However, a single 
wrongful act which violates two (or more) primary rights gives rise to 
two (or more) causes of action.  Moreover, where a plaintiff has more
than one cause of action against a defendant, the plaintiff may join them
in one lawsuit but is not required to do so either by the rules of joinder or 
of res judicata.28  In other words, a plaintiff who has two (or more)
Pomeroy separated the grand division of “Things” into two principal classes—“Real 
rights” and “Personal rights.” Id. at 77-8.  Real rights embraced three distinct subclasses:
1. Rights of property of every degree and kind over lands or chattels, things 
real or things personal; 2. The rights which every person has over and to his
own life, body, limbs, and good name; 3. The rights which certain classes of
persons, namely, husbands, parents, and masters, have over certain other
persons standing in domestic relations with themselves, namely, wives, 
children, and servants and slaves.
Id. at 78.  The second class, “Personal rights,” included two subclasses: “1. Rights 
arising from contract;” and 2. Quasi contract and fiduciary rights arising  “from some
existing relation between two specific persons or groups of persons, which is generally
created by the law.” Id. at 79. 
Pomeroy viewed these general classifications as embracing “all primary rights and 
duties, both legal and equitable, which belong to the private civil law.” Id. at 79. 
24. See Hutchinson v. Ainsworth, 15 P. 82, 84 (Cal. 1887) (citing Pomeroy and
holding that the facts upon which the plaintiff’s right to sue is based, and upon which the 
defendant’s duty has arisen, coupled with the facts that make up the defendant’s wrong, 
constitute a cause of action); see also McCarty v. Fremont, 23 Cal. 196 (1863) (holding 
that the plaintiff was not permitted to plead causes of action for injury to person, injury
to real property, and injury to personal property in one complaint because clear 
violations of the Practice Act’s permissive joinder restrictions); McKee v. Dodd, 93 P.
854, 855 (Cal. 1908) (referring to Pomeroy for the proposition that a primary right and a 
duty combined constitute the cause of action for purposes of pleading).
25. See cases cited supra note 22; see also Crowley v. Katleman, 881 P.2d 1083, 
1090-91 (Cal. 1994) (discussing the primary rights theory and concluding it was 
inapplicable to determination of whether probable cause existed to defeat a malicious
prosecution action); Bay Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. v. Lawyers’ Mutual Ins. Co., 855 
P.2d 1263, 1265-66 (Cal. 1993) (ruling that in determining the meaning of the word
“claim” in a malpractice insurance policy, the fact that the claimant had only one cause
of action under the primary rights theory, although not controlling, was illustrative). 
Recent court of appeal decisions applying the primary rights theory include Weikel v.
TCW Realty Fund II Holding Co., 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 25 (Ct. App. 1997); Brenelli 
Amedeo, S.P.A. v. Bakara Furniture, Inc., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348 (Ct. App. 1994); Branson 
v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 314 (Ct. App. 1994); Takahashi v. Board of
Education, 249 Cal. Rptr. 578 (Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1011 (1989). 
26. See Slater, 543 P.2d at 594. 
27. See id. See also Crowley, 881 P.2d at 1090. 
28. With the exception of certain cross-complaints, joinder of causes of action is 
permissive, not mandatory. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 427.10 (complaints) and
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causes of action against a defendant may pursue them in two (or more) 
separate lawsuits. A judgment in one lawsuit will have no claim 
preclusive effect on the other.29 
Although the genesis of the primary rights theory is found in 
Pomeroy’s writings, the historical evolution of the primary rights theory
is intertwined with California’s nineteenth century pleading and joinder 
rules.30  The primary rights theory was first reflected in the permissive 
joinder of claims provisions of the California Practice Act of 1851.31 
This 1851 Act, which was later codified in former Section 427 of the 
California Code of Civil Procedure, divided all claims into seven
specific categories.32  Claims falling within separate categories could not 
428.10 & 428.30 (cross-complaints) (Deering 1995).  A plaintiff may, if she desires,
bring a separate lawsuit on each cause of action even though permitted to join all of them 
in one complaint. See e.g., Realty Constr. & Mortgage Co. v. Superior Court, 132 P.
1048, 1049 (Cal. 1913) (holding that a plaintiff who is authorized to unite two different 
causes of action in a single complaint is not required to do so; the right of joinder may be 
exercised at the plaintiff’s option, and the defendant has no ground to object if the 
plaintiff brings a separate lawsuit as to each cause of action); Sanderson v. Niemann, 110 
P.2d 1025, 1029 (Cal. 1941) (ruling that joinder of two separate causes of action was 
permissible but not mandatory); Sawyer v. First City Fin. Corp., 177 Cal. Rptr. 398, 405 
(Ct. App. 1981). 
29. See cases cited supra note 28.  The prior judgment may, of course, have issue
preclusive effects in subsequent litigation between the parties. See, e.g., Producers Dairy
Delivery Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co., 718 P.2d 920, 923 (Cal. 1986); Bernhard v. Bank of
America, 122 P.2d 892 (Cal. 1947); Sutphin v. Speik, 99 P.2d 652 (Cal. 1940); 
Todhunter v. Smith, 28 P.2d 916 (Cal. 1934). 
30. See Heiser, Res Judicata, supra note 4, at 572-76; Abandon Primary Rights, 
supra note 10, at 372-385; Holmes v. David H. Bricker, Inc., 452 P.2d 647, 649-50 (Cal. 
1969). The restrictive claim joinder statutes were in effect when Pomeroy published his 
treatises defining the primary rights theory.  See Abandon Primary Rights, supra note 10
at 359-60; POMEROY, EQUITY, supra note 23; Pomeroy, Remedies supra note 23. 
Pomeroy analyzed the permissive joinder provisions of the codes as adopted in several 
states, POMEROY, REMEDIES §§ 438-41, at 476-79; and specifically referred to section
427 of the CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1872), which he then quoted in a 
footnote. Id. § 439, at 477 n.3.  Pomeroy linked his extensive analysis of misjoinder of
causes of action to his attempt to ascertain “the true meaning of the term ‘cause of 
action,’” and discussed both concepts expressly in the context of the restrictive 
categories of permissibly joinable claims under the various state codes.  Id. §§ 442-505,
at 479-533. 
31. 1851 CAL. STAT. 51, 59-60, ch. 5, § 64, codified as amended at CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 427 (repealed 1972).  The Act of 1851 was based on the original Field
Code. See Holmes, 70 Cal. 2d at 788; see also Heiser, Res Judicata, supra note 4, at 
572-73; Abandon Primary Rights, supra note 10, at 380; Friedenthal, supra note 10, at 1; 
J. H. Toelle, Joinder of Actions—With Special Reference to the Montana and California 
Practice, 18 CAL. L. REV. 459, 465 (1930). 
32. 1851 CAL. STAT. 51, 59-60, ch. 5, § 64, codified at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
427 (repealed 1972). 
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be joined in the same complaint, and therefore had to be pleaded in
separate actions.  For example, the original version of Section 427 
permitted a plaintiff to join all claims for injuries to her person against a 
defendant in one complaint, or certain claims for injuries to her property, 
but prohibited plaintiff from pursuing both her personal injury and
property damage claims in one lawsuit.33 
Viewed in this historical context, Pomeroy’s primary rights theory
made sense when adopted by the courts in the 19th century.  If, for 
example, the joinder rules prohibited a plaintiff from pleading claims for 
tortious injury to person and to property against a defendant in one 
lawsuit, a personal injury judgment in the first lawsuit should not 
extinguish plaintiff’s claims for property damages in a second action.34 
Such a claim preclusive effect would have been fundamentally unfair to
the plaintiff, particularly one who had established the defendant’s 
liability in the first action.  Moreover, issue preclusion was available to
minimize any unfairness to a defendant who had successfully defended
against liability in the first lawsuit.35 
Over time, the California courts viewed the categories of permissibly 
joinable claims designated in the original version of former Section 427 
as synonymous with Pomeroy’s classifications of primary rights.36 
Although frequently amended, former Section 427, with its restricted
categories of joinable claims, remained in effect until 1971.37  Effective 
1972, the California legislature repealed Section 427 and replaced it with 
a modern joinder of claims statute.  Recognizing that the former 
permissive joinder categories were arbitrary and inefficient, the 
legislature eliminated such restrictions in favor of a standard which
 33. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 427 (6) & (7) (repealed 1972). 
34. The court in Schermerhorn v. Los Angeles Pacific R.R. Co., 123 P. 351 (Ct.
App. 1912), one of the few appellate decisions to consider this question in the context of
a res judicata determination, employed precisely this reasoning in a simple car crash 
case. The court held that a prior judgment for property damage did not preclude 
plaintiff’s instant suit for personal injuries, although caused by the same negligent act of
the defendant.  The court reasoned that the second suit was not barred because under 
former § 427 the plaintiff could not have sought recovery for injuries to person and
injuries to property in one action. Id. at 456.
 35. In Todhunter v. Smith, 28 P.2d 916 (Cal. 1934), for example, the Court held
that although res judicata did not completely bar the plaintiff’s second action to recover
damages for personal injuries sustained in an automobile collision with the defendant, a
prior judgment whereby plaintiff unsuccessfully sought recovery for damage to his car
collaterally estopped the plaintiff from relitigating the issue of negligence.
36. See Heiser, Res Judicata, supra note 4, at 572-76 (discussing relationship 
between claim joinder and primary rights categories); Holmes, 452 P.2d at 649 (referring 
to former § 427 to explain distinctions among primary rights). 
37. Through frequent amendments between 1907 and 1931, the legislature 
attempted to liberalize the restrictive categories of former Section 427. See Friedenthal, 
supra note 10, at 3-4 (1970). 
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permits a plaintiff to join together any causes of action which she has 
against a defendant.38  This unlimited joinder of claims standard remains 
in effect today.39 
Despite the legislative endorsement of unrestricted joinder of claims
since 1972, the California Supreme Court has continued to employ the
primary rights theory as the basis of California’s res judicata doctrine. 
In current res judicata determinations, the court typically defines the 
scope of a primary right by reference to the “harm suffered,” by the
litigant, as opposed to the particular theory of recovery asserted or
remedy sought.40  Moreover, the possibility remains that a single
wrongful act by a defendant may invade more than one primary right, 
and therefore create more than one cause of action.41  Consequently,
even in modern applications of the primary rights theory, a unitary 
occurrence may give rise to two (or more) causes of action and thereby 
permit the plaintiff to maintain two (or more) separate lawsuits against 
the same defendant.
By focusing on the “harm suffered” by the plaintiff, the primary rights
theory provides an ambiguous and unpredictable test for determining 
38. 1971 CAL. STAT. 380, ch. 244, § 23 (operative July 1, 1972).  The California 
Law Revision Commission had viewed the restricted permissive joinder of claims 
provisions of former § 427 as undesirable, and recommended the adoption of unlimited
joinder as a significant improvement in California procedural law. See 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION RELATING TO
COUNTERCLAIMS AND CROSS-COMPLAINTS, JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION, AND RELATED 
PROVISIONS, 10 CAL. L. REVISION COMM’N REP. 501, 510 (1970).  The legislative 
committee comment to new § 427.10 noted that it superseded former § 427 and
“eliminated the arbitrary categories set forth in that section.”  COMMENT ON CODE OF
CIV. PROC. §427.10, J. SENATE 887 (Cal. April 1, 1971). 
39. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 427.10 (a) (Deering 1995). 
40. In Slater v. Blackwood, 543 P.2d 593, 594 (Cal. 1975), the court ruled that a 
“cause of action” is based upon the “harm suffered,” as opposed to the particular legal 
theory asserted by the litigant, and therefore a judgment for the defendant is a bar to a 
subsequent action by the plaintiff based on the “same injury” to the same right, even 
though plaintiff presents a different legal ground for relief. See also Busick v. 
Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Bd., 500 P.2d 1386, 1391 (Cal. 1972) (observing 
that there is but one cause of action for one personal injury caused by reason of one
wrongful act, even though mutually exclusive remedies are available to the plaintiffs); 
Panos v. Great W. Packing Co., 134 P.2d 242, 244 (Cal. 1943) (holding that a prior
judgment was a bar to prosecution of the instant action against the same defendant for
the “same injuries,” even though instant action based on negligence grounds not
previously known to plaintiff). 
41. See, e.g., Agarwal v. Johnson, 603 P.2d 58, 72 (Cal. 1979); Branson v. Sun-
Diamond Growers, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 314, 322 (Ct. App. 1994); Sawyer v. First City Fin. 
Corp., 177 Cal. Rptr. 398, 403 (Ct. App. 1981). 
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whether a defendant’s conduct creates one or more causes of action.42 
This abstract approach to claim preclusion requires further judicial 
interpretation of what categories of harms are “primary” harms.
Unfortunately, the California Supreme Court has not developed clear 
guidelines for the classification of harms for the purpose of primary
rights distinctions.43 
The lower courts have been more active in providing some general 
classifications.  For example, decisions of the court of appeal have 
recognized tortious injury to one’s person as distinct from injury to one’s 
property, and classified each such harm as a violation of a separate 
primary right.44  The California Supreme Court endorsed, in dicta, this
general primary rights classification in its 1969 opinion in Holmes v.
David H. Bricker, Inc.45 In one other decision, the court of appeal
classified injury to real property as a primary right distinct from injury to 
personal property.46  These categorical primary rights distinctions by the
lower courts are no longer dictated by restrictions on permissive joinder
of claims and may be suspect under a logical interpretation of the “harm 
suffered” approach, but they have not been disapproved by the
42. For a more extensive analysis of the problems caused by the ambiguity and
unpredictability of the primary rights doctrine applied by the California Supreme Court, 
see generally Heiser, Res Judicata, supra note 4 and Abandon Primary Rights, supra
note 10. 
43. See Heiser, Res Judicata, supra note 4, at 576-84 (discussing the lack of clear
and meaningful guidance with respect to primary rights distinctions by the California 
Supreme Court).
44. See, e.g., Schermerhorn v. Los Angeles Pac. R.R. Co., 123 P. 351, 352 (Ct. 
App. 1912); Arlo E. Smith, Comment, Res Judicata in California, 40 CAL. L. REV. 412, 
416 (1952) (citing cases); cf. Weisshand v. City of Petaluma, 174 P. 955, 957 (Ct. App. 
1918) (applying this distinction when construing permissive joinder of claims statute). 
45. 452 P.2d 647 (Cal. 1969).  However, the court in Holmes also limited this 
distinction to tortious injury to person and property, and declined to extend it to such 
injuries caused by breach of contractual warranty. Id. at 650. 
Prior to its Holmes opinion, the Supreme Court had simply assumed, usually in the
context of a misjoinder of claims discussion, that a defendant’s single wrongful act 
injuring plaintiff’s person and property violated two primary rights and therefore created 
two causes of action.  See, e.g., Todhunter v. Smith, 28 P.2d 916, 917 (Cal. 1934) (dicta);
Bowman v. Wohlke, 135 P. 37, 39 (Cal. 1913) (holding that under former section 427 
causes of action for injuries to property and to person could not be united in one lawsuit); 
Lamb v. Harbaugh, 39 P. 56, 57 (Cal. 1895) (ruling that allegations of injuries to person
and property constituted two distinct causes of action which were misjoined in 
complaint); Thelin v, Stewart, 34 P. 861, 862 (Cal. 1893) (holding that causes of action
for injury to property and to person could not be joined, under former section 427, in one 
complaint).
46. See McNulty v. Copp, 271 P.2d 90, 98 (Ct. App. 1954).  The court in McNulty
ruled that plaintiff’s prior action for recovery of possession of real property involved a 
different primary right than the instant action to recover damages for wrongful detention 
of personal property located on the real property, even though both injuries were caused 
by the same wrongful conduct. Id. at 97-98. 
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California Supreme Court.47  In other decisions, the court of appeal has 
made numerous primary rights distinctions, on an ad hoc basis, and held 
that a defendant’s conduct gave rise to more than one cause of action.48 
2. 	 A Brief Comparison of the Inefficient Primary Rights Doctrine with 
the More Efficient Second Restatement of Judgments
California’s primary rights approach to claim preclusion is a distinctly 
minority view.  The vast majority of states, as well as the federal courts, 
have adopted the transactional approach of the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments as their claim preclusion doctrine.49  A comparison of these
two approaches to claim preclusion illustrates the inefficiencies of 
California’s continued reliance on the primary rights theory.
On a general level the doctrine set forth in the second Restatement is
similar to the California doctrine prohibiting claim-splitting.  Under both 
doctrines, a valid and final judgment operates as a bar to the
maintenance of a second suit between the same parties or their privies on 
the “same cause of action.”50  Likewise, both doctrines bar a second suit 
47. See Heiser, Res Judicata, supra note 4, at 578-84.  Even after the enactment of 
the unrestricted joinder of claims statute in 1972, the California Supreme Court has 
continued to rule that a unitary wrongful conduct by a defendant may violate multiple 
primary rights and therefore create multiple causes of action.  See Agarwal v. Johnson, 
603 P.2d 58, 72 (Cal. 1979). 
48. See, e.g., Brenelli Amedeo S.P.A. v. Bakara Furniture, Inc., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
348 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding that a prior judgment against defendant corporation based 
on contractual obligations involved a different primary right, and did not bar a second 
action for tortious conveyance of assets preventing plaintiff from collecting on his 
judgment); Branson v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 314 (Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that the denial of statutory indemnity to plaintiff in a prior action involved a 
different primary right than the instant action for contractual indemnity); Craig v. County
of Los Angeles, 271 Cal. Rptr. 82 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding that prior mandamus
judgment, which ordered defendant to hire plaintiff, involved the primary right to
employment; whereas the instant action involves the primary right to recover damages 
because of the denial of that employment right); Sawyer v. First City Fin. Corp., 177 Cal.
Rptr. 398 (Ct. App. 1981) (holding that prior action for breach of contract involved a 
different primary right than the instant action for tortious conduct destroying the value of 
the contract).
49. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24, apps. 4 & 5 (1982).  See also
Abandon Primary Rights, supra note 10, at 353 n.11 (indicating that at most nine states, 
including California, do not follow the transactional standard as their claim preclusion
doctrine), and at 408 n. 542. 
50. Section 17 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS (1982) explains the 
effects of a former adjudication as follows: 
A valid and final personal judgment is conclusive between the parties, except
on appeal or other direct review, to the following extent: 
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on the same cause of action even though the plaintiff is prepared in the
second suit to present evidence, issues, grounds for relief, or legal
theories different than those presented in the first action; or to seek new
forms of relief not demanded in the first action.51  Under both doctrines, 
if the cause of action asserted in the prior litigation is not the same as 
that in the second proceeding, the judgment in the prior litigation does 
not constitute a bar to the subsequent proceeding.52 
Of primary importance to both res judicata doctrines, therefore, is the
definition of the same “cause of action.”  Here the California Supreme 
Court and the second Restatement part company.  The Restatement
defines the “claim”53 extinguished by a prior judgment to include “all 
If the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, the claim is extinguished and





If the judgment is in favor of the defendant, the claim is extinguished and 

the judgment bars a subsequent action on that claim (see § 19); 

A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant is conclusive, 

in a subsequent action between them on the same or a different claim,

with respect to any issue actually litigated and determined if its 

determination was essential to that judgment. (see § 27). 

See id. § 17. Section 18 further defines the general rule of merger and provides that a 
judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff precludes another action by the plaintiff on
the original claim, although not an action upon the judgment.  Section 19 reiterates the 
general rule of bar and provides that a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant on 
the merits bars another action by the plaintiff on the “same claim.” 
51. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 25 (1982); Panos v. Great W. 
Packing Co., 134 P.2d 242 (Cal. 1943) (holding that judgment for defendant in prior suit 
barred second suit to recover for same injuries even though based on an entirely different 
factual basis of negligence); Slater v. Blackwood, 543 P.2d 593 (Cal. 1975) (holding that 
a prior defense judgment based upon statutory negligence barred a second action against 
the defendant for the same personal injuries even though based upon a different theory of
ordinary negligence); Wulfjen v. Dolton, 151 P.2d 846 (Cal. 1944) (holding that 
judgment for defendant in prior fraud action for recision of contract precluded second 
fraud action for damages). 
52. In Agarwal v. Johnson, 603 P.2d 58 (Cal. 1979), the court observed that 
“[u]nless the requisite identity of causes of action is established, however, the first 
judgment will not operate as a bar.” Id. at 72. 
53. The second Restatement uses the term “claim” to describe the scope of the 
matter extinguished by a judgment; California uses the older cognate term “cause of
action” for the same purpose.  These terms are used in many ways for many purposes,
and have various meanings in different contexts, which make their use for res judicata 
purposes even more confusing. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 intro. note 
(1982); Bay Cities Paving & Grading, Inc., v. Lawyers’ Mut. Ins. Co., 855 P.2d 1263
(Cal. 1993) (construing “cause of action” as used in a malpractice insurance policy to
determine coverage); Lilienthal & Fowler v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 458 (Ct. 
App. 1993) (distinguishing “cause of action” in the summary adjudication statute, where 
it means theory of liability, from the res judicata context, where it means the invasion of 
a primary right); Slater, 543 P.2d at 595 (observing that the phrase “cause of action” is
“often used indiscriminately to mean what it says and to mean counts which state 
differently the same cause of action”).  In this article, “claim” and “cause of action” are 
used interchangeably and, for the most part, only in the res judicata sense. 
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rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to 
all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out 
of which the action arose.”54  By contrast, as already explained, the
California Supreme Court adheres to a definition of “cause of action”
based on the primary rights theory.55 
Under the second Restatement a valid and final judgment precludes 
subsequent litigation of all rights of the parties to relief with respect to
the transaction out of which the action arose.56  The  Restatement 
approach is unconcerned with whether an out-of-court event violates one
or more separate primary rights, or vests the parties with multiple 
substantive theories of recovery or forms of relief.  Instead, the
Restatement instructs the parties to litigate all rights to remedies which
arise from the factual transaction that gave rise to the lawsuit, regardless 
of the number of primary rights that may have been invaded during the 
transaction. Any such rights to relief, and any issues raised or which 
could have been raised, will be extinguished by the judgment.57 
The following hypothetical illustrates the difference between the
primary rights and the transactional approaches to claim preclusion. 
Assume that defendant’s car collides with plaintiff’s car on the freeway. 
Both parties were seriously injured, and their respective vehicles
destroyed.  Plaintiff wishes to recover damages for the injuries to her
person and property caused by the defendant’s negligence.  Must the 
plaintiff pursue her claims for personal injuries and property damages in
one lawsuit, or will she be permitted to pursue them in more than one 
action? 
Under established California primary rights precedent, the defendant’s
wrongful act invaded two of plaintiff’s primary rights—the rights to be 
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1) (1982).  Section 24(2)
provides the following additional explanation of this transactional approach: “What
factual grouping constitutes a ‘transaction,’ and what groupings constitute a ‘series,’ are
to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the 
facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient
trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations or 
business understanding or usage.”  Id. § 24(2). 
55. See supra notes 22-48 and accompanying text. 
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982). 
57. See id. §§ 24 & 25. Section 25 (1) states that the rule of claim preclusion
stated in section 24 extinguishes a claim by the plaintiff against the defendant even 
though the plaintiff is prepared in the second action to “present evidence or grounds or
theories of the case not presented in the first action.” Id. § 25. 
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free from tortious injury to person and to property.58 Plaintiff therefore
has two causes of action against the defendant, and may pursue them in
two separate lawsuits.59  Under the Restatement’s approach, however, 
the plaintiff must pursue all rights to remedies against the defendant with
respect to the factual transaction—the car crash—in one lawsuit.
Plaintiff therefore must seek recovery for injuries to her person and to 
her car in one lawsuit; the Restatement doctrines of merger and bar 
prevent her from maintaining separate actions for the injuries to her
person and to her property.60 
Under both the California doctrine and the second Restatement, a 
“claim” is never broader than the transaction to which it relates.61  Both
view the “transaction” as marking the outer limits of the “claim”—a
judgment in a prior action does not preclude a second action unless both 
actions derived from the same transaction.62  But unlike the
Restatement’s use of “transaction,” the California primary rights
approach does not make a “cause of action” coterminous with the 
58. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. 
59. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. 
60. See  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18 (merger), § 19 (bar), and § 
24, cmt. c, illus. 1 (1982). 
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24, cmt. a (1982).  See, e.g., Louis
Stores, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 371 P.2d 758, 762 (Cal. 1962) 
(holding that a 1953 agency decision refusing to revoke the plaintiff store’s liquor
license did not bar the agency’s second revocation proceeding because the second 
proceeding was based on events occurring after 1953 and therefore presented a cause of 
action different from the one determined in 1953); Abbott v. 76 Land & Water Co., 118 
P. 425, 428 (Cal. 1911) (noting that a continuous breach of contract by a defendant who
has a continuous duty to perform gives rise to a new cause of action for as long as the
breach continues); Swartzendruber v. City of San Diego, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 64, 73 (Ct. App.
1992) (holding that plaintiff’s sex discrimination cause of action was not barred by prior 
judgment which found plaintiff’s termination not wrongful because instant action alleges 
discriminatory conduct that arguably occurred before and was not necessarily part of her
termination from employment); Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 197 Cal. Rptr. 612, 616 (Ct.
App. 1983) (citing cases for the proposition that a judgment does not bar subsequent
lawsuits based on illegal conduct by the defendant occurring after the date of the 
judgment).
62. For example, although a plaintiff may have suffered the same type of harm on
two occasions as the result of the defendant’s misconduct, the plaintiff will have two 
causes of action if the harm arose from two separate transactions.  See, e.g., Louis Stores, 
371 P.2d at 762; Frommhagen v. Board of Supervisors, 243 Cal. Rptr. 390, 394 (Ct. 
App. 1987) (holding that the plaintiff’s suit challenging the defendant county’s
calculation of service charges for fiscal year 1985-1986 was not barred by the plaintiff’s 
prior action which unsuccessfully challenged the calculation for 1984-85); Zingheim v. 
Marshall, 57 Cal. Rptr. 809, 814 (Ct. App. 1967) (holding that the plaintiff, who had 
already recovered accrued monthly payments due under an installment sales contract, 
was not barred from seeking recovery of unpaid installments accruing subsequent to the
prior judgment); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1047 (Deering 1996) (providing that
“[s]uccessive actions may be maintained upon the same contract or transaction,
whenever, after the former action, a new cause of action arises therefrom”). See also 
authorities cited supra note 61. 
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transaction itself. A unitary transaction or occurrence, under the 
California doctrine, gives rise to more than one cause of action if it
violates more than one primary right.63  By contrast, under the 
Restatement view a unitary transaction or occurrence by definition 
constitutes a single claim.64  Consequently, as compared to the
Restatement’s transactional approach, California’s narrow use of the 
definition of a “cause of action” barred by a prior judgment is a less 
inclusive, therefore a substantively inefficient, approach to claim 
preclusion.
An understanding of the niceties of the primary rights theory, which
are many, or of the Restatement’s transactional standard, is not really
necessary for purposes of the issue preclusion problems discussed
below. What is important to know about California’s use of the primary
rights theory, however, is that it is a substantively inefficient claim
preclusion doctrine.  A single wrongful act by a defendant may violate 
multiple primary rights and thereby vest the plaintiff with multiple 
causes of action.  Moreover, neither the rules of claim preclusion nor of 
claim joinder compel the plaintiff to pursue all her causes of action in 
one lawsuit. Consequently, California’s claim preclusion doctrine is
substantively inefficient—it sometimes permits a plaintiff to maintain 
multiple lawsuits to redress injuries caused by a defendant’s unitary 
conduct.
California’s claim preclusion doctrine is not, perhaps, directly relevant 
to the problems with the issue preclusion doctrine addressed in this 
Article. These two doctrines seemingly operate in mutually exclusive 
spheres—the issue preclusive effects of a prior judgment only become 
relevant when the claim preclusive effect does not totally bar the
subsequent litigation.  However, as will be discussed later, the narrow 
and therefore substantively inefficient definition of the “cause of action” 
barred by claim preclusion may have influenced the California courts to
recoup some efficiencies by broadly defining the scope of the “issues” 
63. See, e.g., Holmes v. David H. Bricker, Inc., 452 P.2d 647, 647 (Cal. 1969)
(endorsing the view that a single tortious act causing injury to person and to property
constitutes violations of two primary rights and therefore creates two causes of action);
Agarwal v. Johnson, 603 P.2d 58, 72 (Cal. 1979) (ruling that different primary rights
may be violated by the same wrongful conduct).  Professor Pomeroy emphasized this 
point in his treatise defining the primary rights theory: “The same primary right may be 
broken by many kinds of wrong-doing; and the same wrongful act or default may invade 
many different rights.” POMEROY, EQUITY, supra note 23, § 91, at 103. 
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24, cmt. a (1982). 
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foreclosed by collateral estoppel.  At any rate, a basic understanding of 
California’s claim preclusion doctrine is useful background to the issue 
preclusion discussion which is the focus of the remainder of this Article. 
II. CALIFORNIA’S CONFUSING ISSUE PRECLUSION DOCTRINE




Under the collateral estoppel aspect of res judicata, a party is barred 
from raising an issue of fact or law if that issue was “actually litigated
and determined” in a prior proceeding involving a different cause of
action.65  Unlike claim preclusion, where the California courts apply 
their own primary rights theory, the California courts usually rely on the 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments when resolving questions of issue
preclusion. Court opinions quote extensively from relevant blackletter 
sections of the second Restatement, as well as from the explanations 
contained in the various section comments. 66  Courts also state that this
doctrine rests upon the sound policy of limiting litigation by preventing 
a party who has had “one fair adversary hearing” on an issue from again 
drawing it into controversy.67 
65. See, e.g., Lucido v. Superior Court, 795 P.2d 1223, 1225-28 (Cal. 1990); 
People v. Sims, 651 P.2d 321, 331 (Cal. 1982); Todhunter v. Smith, 28 P.2d 916, 918-
919 (Cal. 1934). 
66. See, e.g., County of Santa Clara v. Deputy Sheriffs’ Ass’n, 838 P.2d 781, 784
n.7 (Cal. 1992) (citing comment h to § 27 in determining that trial court’s findings in
previous action were unnecessary to the judgment); Lucido, 795 P.2d at 1225 cert. 
denied, 500 U.S. 920 (1991) (citing § 27); George Arakelian Farms, Inc. v. Agricultural 
Labor Relations Bd., 783 P.2d 749, 755 n.7 (Cal. 1989) (citing § 27, quoting § 13 and §
83, and noting that res judicata is especially appropriate for a RESTATEMENT); In re
Nathaniel P., 259 Cal. Rptr. 555 (Ct. App. 1989) (quoting § 28(4)); Barker v. Hull, 236
Cal. Rptr. 285, 288 (Ct. App. 1987) (quoting § 27 and comment d for the purpose of
determining whether an issue had been “actually litigated” in a prior action); Sandoval v.
Superior Court, 190 Cal. Rptr. 29 (Ct. App. 1983) (relying on § 29 and comments 
thereunder). See also cases cited supra note 73. 
67. See, e.g., Sims, 651 P.2d at 329 (ruling that the party to be collaterally estopped
by prior agency decision must have been provided an adequate opportunity to fully
present the issue during administrative hearing); Vella v. Hudgins, 572 P.2d 28, 31 (Cal. 
1977) (holding that a prior unlawful detainer action did not provide plaintiff a full and
fair opportunity to litigate issue of fraud, and therefore collateral estoppel inapplicable); 
Bernhard v. Bank of America, 122 P.2d 892, 894 (Cal. 1942) (rejecting doctrine of
mutuality and noting that due process requires that party to be collaterally estopped must
have an opportunity for one fair trial of an issue); Long Beach Grand Prix Ass’n v. Hunt, 
31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 70 (Ct. App. 1994) (collecting cases); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 28(5)(c) (1982) (providing for relitigation of an issue where party sought 
to be precluded did not have an adequate opportunity to obtain a full and fair
adjudication in the initial action).
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1.	 Threshold Requirements for Collateral Estoppel Distinguished from
Public Policy Considerations 
Recently, in Lucido v. Superior Court,68 the California Supreme Court
restated the threshold requirements of the doctrine, which are essentially 
the same as those stated in section 27 of the second Restatement,69 and 
distinguished them from the public policy considerations of collateral 
estoppel:70 
First, the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be 
identical to that decided in a former proceeding.71  Second, this issue
must have been actually litigated in the former proceeding.  Third, it 
must have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding.72  Fourth,
the decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the merits.
Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same 
68. 795 P.2d 1223 (Cal. 1990). 
69. Section 27 of the second RESTATEMENT states the blackletter general rule of
issue preclusion as follows:
When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a
valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, 
the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, 
whether on the same or a different claim. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982). 
Section 28 (1)-(5) states several blackletter exceptions to this general rule.  Even 
though the requirements of section 27 are satisfied, relitigation of an issue is not 
precluded in a variety of circumstances, including where there are differences in the 
quality of the procedures followed in the two proceedings, where there is an intervening
change in the applicable legal context, where there is a convincing need for a new 
determination because of the adverse impact on the public interest, where there was a
lack of opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication in the prior action, 
or “because it was not sufficiently foreseeable at the time of the initial action that the
issue would arise in the context of a subsequent action.” Id. § 28(5)(b). 
70. Lucido, 795 P.2d at 1225. 
71. The Lucido Court further noted that the “identical issue” requirement addresses 
whether “identical factual allegations” are at stake in the two proceedings, not whether 
the ultimate issues or dispositions are the same. Id. 
72. See id. The Lucido Court defined the “necessarily decided” requirement to
mean that the issue must not have been “entirely unnecessary” to the judgment in the 
prior proceeding. Id. at 1226; see also Sims, 651 P.2d at 331-33 (holding the issue 
“necessarily decided” because a determination of innocence by preponderance of 
evidence “necessarily” determined lack of proof beyond a reasonable doubt).  One of the 
more interesting applications of this “necessarily decided” requirement is where a 
judgment is based on two or more alternative grounds and either ground, standing alone, 
could support the judgment. For a discussion of this application, see Adam Siegler,
Alternative Grounds In Collateral Estoppel, 17 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1085 (1984); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27, cmts. i and o (1982). 
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as, or in privity73 with, the party to the former proceeding. The Lucido 
Court then stated that even where all these basic requirements are
satisfied, the public policies underlying the doctrine must be examined
before concluding that collateral estoppel should be applied in a 
particular setting.74 
The Lucido Court identified the public policies underlying collateral
estoppel as “preservation of the integrity of the judicial system,
promotion of judicial economy, and protection of litigants from 
harassment by vexatious litigation;” and ruled that consideration of these 
public policies may influence “whether its application in a particular 
circumstance would be fair to the parties and constitutes sound judicial 
policy.”75  The Court in Lucido refused to apply collateral estoppel to bar
73. The concept of “privity” traditionally refers to a cluster of relationships under
which the preclusive effects of a prior judgment extend beyond a party to the original 
action and apply to persons having specified relationships to that party, such as 
successors in interest, persons represented by a fiduciary, and persons who have a 
financial interest in and control of the conduct of the prior lawsuit.  See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF  JUDGMENTS §§ 34-61 (1982); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1908(a) & (b)
(Deering 1996); Clemmer v. Hartford Ins. Co., 587 P.2d 1098 (Cal. 1978) (collecting 
cases); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 544 P.2d 941, 946 (Cal. 1976) (extending privity to
persons represented by a fiduciary).  Although traditional applications of the concept 
were quite limited, the modern California doctrine of privity is much broader.  In
Clemmer the Court expanded the concept to apply to any relationship between the party 
to be precluded and the unsuccessful party in the prior litigation which is “sufficiently
close” so as to justify application of res judicata or collateral estoppel.  Clemmer, 587
P.2d at 1102; see also Sims, 651 P.2d at 332-33 (applying the “sufficiently close” 
standard to find the district attorney office and the county in privity).
The “sufficiently close” test for determining privity is, to put it mildly, imprecise and
ambiguous.  This flexible definition of privity is limited by the requirements of due 
process, whose parameters are equally vague.  For example, the Court in Clemmer, 587
P.2d at 1102, observes that, in the context of collateral estoppel: 
due process requires that the party to be estopped must have had an identity or
community of interest with, and adequate representation by, the losing party in
the first action as well as that the circumstances must have been such that the
party to be estopped should reasonably have expected to be bound by the prior 
adjudication.
As the Clemmer Court astutely acknowledged, “[p]rivity is a concept not readily
susceptible of uniform definition.”  Id. In other words, the modern California privity
doctrine is ambiguous.  When compared to the more limited traditional doctrine, this 
modern view of privity does promote substantive economy. However, because the
modern doctrine provides little guidance to litigants and courts, its application is 
unpredictable. The problems created by California’s current privity doctrine merit 
extended analyses, but such treatment is beyond the scope of this Article. 
74. Lucido, 795 P.2d at 1226-27. 
75. Id. Lucido was not the first time the California Supreme Court had applied
these public policy considerations in an direct and meaningful manner to a collateral 
estoppel determination. See, e.g., Clemmer, 587 P.2d at 1101-03; People v. Taylor, 527
P.2d 622, 628 (Cal. 1974) (ruling that policy considerations supported application of
collateral estoppel in the instant case).
The Court in Clemmer considered whether a prior murder verdict collaterally estopped 
the victim’s family, who had file a wrongful death suit seeking recovery from the 
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relitigation of an issue actually determined in a prior probation 
revocation proceeding, even though the threshold requirements were 
fulfilled, because it concluded that to do so in the particular
circumstances of the case before it would be inconsistent with these
public policies.76 
As Lucido illustrates, the California Supreme Court intends some 
flexibility in the application of collateral estoppel such that relitigation 
of an identical issue will not be precluded. In addition to the flexibility 
introduced by the public policy considerations employed in Lucido, the 
California Supreme Court has refused to apply collateral estoppel, 
although all the basic requirements are met, because to do so would be 
inconsistent with the public interest77 or because the prior proceeding 
was before an administrative agency as opposed to a court.78 
criminal defendant’s liability insurer, from contending the killing was not willful and 
therefore not excluded from coverage.  The court rejected the collateral estoppel defense 
and concluded that the requisite privity did not exist between the victim’s family and the 
criminal defendant.  See Clemmer, 587 P.2d at 1102-03.  The Clemmer Court recognized 
the notion of privity had expanded to a relationship between the party to be estopped and
the unsuccessful party in the prior litigation which is “sufficiently close” so as to justify 
the application of collateral estoppel.  However, the Court reasoned, in deciding whether
to apply collateral estoppel, the Court must balance the rights of the party to be estopped 
against the need for applying collateral estoppel in the particular case, “in order to
promote judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation, to prevent inconsistent 
judgments which undermine the integrity of the judicial system, or to protect against 
vexatious litigation.” Id. at 1102. 
76. Lucido, 795 P.2d at 1231-33. 
77. These cases usually involve an issue of law, and frequently involve a 
government agency as the party in whose favor the exception is applied. See, e.g., Kopp 
v. Fair Political Practices Com’n, 905 P.2d 1248, 115-116 (Cal. 1995) (ruling that the 
public interest requires that relitigation of the issue not be foreclosed); Arcadia Unified 
Sch. Dist. v. State Dept. of Educ., 825 P.2d 438, 440-42 (Cal. 1992) (ruling that state 
agency was not collaterally estopped from relitigating constitutionality of statute 
authorizing school districts to charge fees for pupil transportation); Chern v. Bank of
America, 544 P.2d 1310, 1313-14 (Cal. 1976) (applying exception to permit relitigation 
of certain banking practices issues based on strong public interest to regulate banking
evidenced by applicable statutes).
78. In George Arakelian Farms, Inc., v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 783 
P.2d 749, 755-56 (Cal. 1989), the California Supreme Court noted that although
collateral estoppel rules are generally applicable to administrative orders, their 
enforcement is “more flexible” in that context.  With respect to the application of 
collateral estoppel to administrative agency decisions, the courts have expressed concern
with whether the agency proceeding was adjudicatory in nature and provided a full and 
fair opportunity to litigate an issue.  See, e.g., People v. Sims, 651 P.2d 321 (Cal. 1982)
(applying collateral estoppel after finding that an agency hearing afforded the parties a
fair adversary proceeding in which they could fully litigate the issue of welfare fraud); 
Hollywood Circle, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 361 P.2d 712, 714
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This flexibility not to apply collateral estoppel is intentional and is not 
the unforeseen consequence of ambiguity in some doctrinal standard. 
Moreover, this flexibility is limited in application; it is available only in 
certain circumstances and even then may be exercised only in favor of
underinclusion.79  However, as discussed below, California’s basic 
collateral estoppel doctrine is also flexible in another basic area due to 
doctrinal uncertainty.  Unfortunately, this type of flexibility makes the 
doctrine confusing, facially inconsistent, and unpredictable. 
2.	 Public Policy Considerations and the Need for Underinclusive 
Collateral Estoppel Determinations
The California Supreme Court’s policy analysis in Lucido is 
instructive as to the appropriate judicial attitude toward collateral
estoppel. The Court not only identified and explained the public policy 
considerations underlying collateral estoppel, but applied them as 
meaningful components of the doctrine.  The Court first explained the 
“integrity of judicial determinations” factor.  The Court observed that 
public confidence in the integrity of the judicial system is threatened
whenever two tribunals render inconsistent judgments.  However, the 
Court then reasoned that consistency is not the sole measure of the
integrity of the judicial system: “We must also consider whether
eliminating potential inconsistency . . . would undermine public con-
fidence in the judicial system.”80 
Next, the Lucido Court considered the “judicial economy” factor.
Obviously, the Court recognized that the application of collateral 
estoppel would promote judicial economy by precluding relitigation of 
issues already determined in a prior proceeding.  Nevertheless, the Court 
(Cal. 1961) (noting that some administrative determinations differ from court decisions 
and therefore greater flexibility is required in applying res judicata to them).  See also
Perschbacher, supra note 11 (explaining why administrative determinations should not 
be given full collateral estoppel effect).
79. Underinclusion, when used in this context, means that the flexibility in the 
application of the broad rules of issue preclusion may only be exercised in favor of
nonpreclusion, never in favor of preclusion. See Unforeseeable Preclusion, supra note 
6, at 923-929, 953 (discussing the need for clear, but underinclusive, rules in res judicata 
such that preclusion will not apply in unforeseeable situations). 
80. Lucido, 795 P.2d at 1229-30. The Court’s concern here was with the public’s 
confidence in the integrity of the criminal justice system if issues determined adverse to 
the prosecution in a probation revocation hearings were to displace full determination of 
factual issues in criminal trials.  This concern for public confidence is clearly more 
evident in criminal as opposed to civil litigation, but the Court did not so limit its 
analysis.  In fact, the Court utilized a civil case, Vella v. Hudgins, 572 P.2d 28 (Cal. 
1977), wherein the Court refused to apply collateral estoppel to unlawful detainer
decisions, to help support its integrity of judicial determinations reasoning.  Lucido, 795
P.2d at 1231. 
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simply concluded without further discussion that such efficiencies were
outweighed by the concern for the integrity of the judicial system. 
Finally, the Court addressed the “vexatious litigation” consideration. 
The Court noted that the application of collateral estoppel would 
certainly eliminate repetitive litigation.81  But the Court fine-tuned this
policy consideration by ruling that “[t]he essence of vexatiousness . . . is
not mere repetition. Rather, it is harassment through baseless or
unjustified litigation.”82 
Although Lucido involved the application of collateral estoppel in 
criminal litigation, the Court’s policy analysis is not, by its terms,
limited to criminal cases.  However, the Court’s view of the “integrity of 
the judicial system” as outweighing all other policy considerations may
not be the same in the context of civil litigation.  Nevertheless, the 
Lucido Court’s policy analysis is highly instructive as to the proper 
application of collateral estoppel in civil cases.  Lucido demonstrates 
that even where all the basic requirements of the collateral estoppel 
doctrine are satisfied, policy considerations may make application of the
doctrine inappropriate in certain circumstances.  Consequently, Lucido
authorized relitigation of an identical issue previously litigated even 
though the Court expressed little doubt that the issue was “actually 
litigated” and “finally decided” in the prior proceeding.83  The  Lucido 
Court’s willingness to hold collateral estoppel inapplicable in 
circumstances where the prerequisites were clearly met suggests that the
Court would have been even more eager to avoid issue preclusion if the 
basic requirements had not been so clearly established in that case. 
Lucido is also instructive as to the relative importance of “judicial
economy” in a collateral estoppel determination.  Lucido suggests that 
the obvious efficiencies to be derived from applying collateral estoppel 
in a particular case may be outweighed by other, more important policy
concerns. The overriding policy concern in Lucido was the integrity of
the criminal justice system as a whole.  In the context of civil litigation,
a similar overriding concern is the fundamental fairness of an 
opportunity for one full adversary hearing on an issue.84 
81. See id. at 1232. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 1225-26. 
84. Of course, this due process concern is present in all litigation, whether criminal
or civil in nature.  But this concern is more likely the only one relevant to the “integrity
of judicial determinations” factor in the context of civil litigation.  In Lucido, the Court 
was concerned with public confidence in the criminal justice system if, due to the 
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Finally, Lucido recognizes that vexatious litigation is a less significant
concern in a collateral estoppel determination than, for example, a claim 
preclusion determination.  By definition, collateral estoppel may only 
come into play when res judicata permits the parties to maintain 
consecutive proceedings. Thus, as Lucido correctly observes, collateral
estoppel is not designed to eliminate repetitive litigation between the 
same parties. Rather, collateral estoppel is intended to eliminate 
harassment through baseless or unjustified litigation.  Certainly a party 
who raises an issue in a subsequent lawsuit that was at best arguably, but 
not clearly, “actually litigated and determined” in the prior proceeding 
should not run afoul of the policy against vexatious litigation as defined 
by Lucido. 
The Lucido court’s use of public policy considerations to depart from 
the broad issue preclusion rules suggests, and correctly so, a certain
judicial attitude toward collateral estoppel determinations that is not 
evident in claim preclusion determinations.85 Lucido suggests the proper
judicial attitude is that the blackletter rules of collateral estoppel should 
be applied in an underinclusive manner.  Underinclusion in Lucido 
meant that collateral estoppel would not bar relitigation of an issue, in 
application of collateral estoppel to an issue determined in a prior probation revocation
hearing, the ultimate determination of a criminal defendant’s guilt or innocence were not 
made in a criminal trial.  Probation revocation hearings and criminal trials serve different 
public interests and functions, the court reasoned, and these differences justify permitting 
a criminal prosecution to relitigate issues determined adversely to the People in a prior
probation revocation hearing.  An analogous public interest concern is rarely evident in 
consecutive civil proceedings, but the concern for fairness to parties who may be
foreclosed by unclear preclusion rules is evident in such circumstances.  See, e.g., Vella, 
572 P.2d at 31-32 (declining to extend full collateral estoppel effect to unlawful detainer 
judgments because such summary proceedings do not provide parties a full and fair 
adversary hearing on all issues). 
Unlike criminal cases, the integrity of the court system is unlikely to be implicated in
civil litigation where one party seeks to relitigate an issue already fully and fairly
litigated in a prior lawsuit between the same parties.  See, e.g., Younan v. Caruso, 59 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 103, 110 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding that the application of collateral estoppel 
to bar relitigation of an ineffective representation issue in the instant malpractice action, 
based on adverse determination in prior habeas corpus proceeding, promotes integrity of
the judicial system and judicial economy within the meaning of Lucido). Public 
confidence in the judicial system is a factor in civil cases, however, where confusing and 
unpredictable rules foreclose a party from litigating an issue in a subsequent proceeding.
The public may view the judicial system’s use of such rules, when applied to bar
litigation of issues, as fundamentally unfair.
85. The California courts do not recognize any Lucido-type public policy 
exceptions to the operation of the primary rights doctrine.  If the rules of claim 
preclusion are satisfied, a court may not reject that doctrine as a defense.  See Slater v. 
Blackwood, 543 P.2d 593, 595 (Cal. 1975) (rejecting argument that courts have 
discretionary power to refuse to apply claim preclusion when to do so would constitute a 
manifest injustice); Robert J. v. Leslie M., 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 905, 907-08 (Ct. App. 1997) 
(observing that public policy exceptions to claim preclusion are extremely narrow and 
have never enjoyed wide approval or frequent application). 
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the context of a criminal case, even though the blackletter rules of
preclusion were clearly satisfied. 
Underinclusion in the context of civil litigation may mean the same as
it did in Lucido, as in the case of the “public interest” exception. More 
importantly, underinclusion also means that to accomplish the stated
policies of issue preclusion, including that a party be provided one full 
and fair opportunity to litigate an issue, collateral estoppel should not be 
invoked in circumstances where issue preclusion could not have been
predicted because the preclusion rules are confusing or their application 
is unclear. As in the analogous context of privity, where the rules are 
vague and limited by due process, collateral estoppel should not
foreclose litigation of an issue unless “the circumstances . . . have been
such that the party to be estopped should reasonably have been expected
to be bound by the prior adjudication.”86  As discussed in the next 
section, California’s issue preclusion rules are confusing and
unpredictable in (at least) two related ways. 
B. The California Supreme Court Has Provided Confusing 





The most significant problems in applying the basic collateral estoppel 
doctrine involve two related determinations: (1) whether the issue sought
to be litigated in the current lawsuit is “identical” to an issue previously
litigated; and, (2) whether this issue was “actually litigated and 
determined” in the prior proceeding.  The “identical issue” requirement
creates difficulties when the issues are not totally identical in the literal
sense of time, place, or occurrence, nor in the sense of precisely the 
same legal context.  Courts sometimes must determine whether or not a
party is seeking to relitigate an issue previously litigated even though the
two proceedings involve different historical transactions87 or changes in 
factual circumstances,88 or raise the issue in a different legal context.89 
86. Clemmer v. Hartford Ins. Co., 587 P.2d 1098, 1102-03 (Cal. 1978). 
87. Courts sometimes find collateral estoppel inapplicable in a subsequent action
involving parallel facts but concerning a different historical transaction.  See, e.g., Chern 
v. Bank of America, 544 P.2d 1310 (Cal. 1976).  Other times, courts conclude the fact 
that issues previously determined in a prior judgment related to a different historical 
transaction does not “separate the issues or render them non-identical.”  County of Los
Angeles v. County Assessment Appeals Bd., 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 479, 483 (Ct. App. 1993). 
88. Compare, e.g., Evans v. Celotex Corp., 238 Cal. Rptr. 259 (Ct. App. 1987) 
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Such problems are inherent in any attempt to delineate the issues
foreclosed by prior litigation where such issues do not arise in the 
context of the same cause of action, and are perhaps an inevitable
byproduct of any collateral estoppel doctrine.90 
The “actually litigated and determined” requirement would seem to be 
less troublesome to apply—an issue was either actually considered and
(holding that a prior judgment which found that a relative’s illness was not caused by
asbestos exposure collaterally estopped instant wrongful death action despite new facts
that relative died after prior judgments and autopsy revealed asbestos exposure was the
cause of the relative’s illness and death) with Melendres v. City of Los Angeles, 115 Cal. 
Rptr. 409 (Ct. App. 1974) (ruling that collateral estoppel did not bar police department’s 
instant action to make salary adjustments that reflected the prevailing wage in private 
industry as provided by city charter, despite an earlier judgment that there was no
corresponding job classification in private industry, because of new facts of changed 
circumstances in the form of consultant’s plan which created a method of making such
prevailing wage comparisons). 
89. The courts sometimes conclude that collateral estoppel does not apply where 
the same issue arises in different legal contexts.  See, e.g., Lucas v. County of Los 
Angeles, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 655 (Ct. App. 1996) (ruling that collateral estoppel was 
inapplicable because determination that defendant acted “reasonably” in the context of 
qualified immunity defense in prior federal civil rights action not the same issue as 
“reasonable action” in context of defense of immunity in instant state law negligence 
claim); Ruffalo v. Patterson, 285 Cal. Rptr. 647 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that
determination in plaintiff’s prior dissolution of marriage judgment that certain property
was community property did not collaterally estop plaintiff from suing her former
attorney for negligently instructing plaintiff to characterize the property as community
property). 
90. Comment c to § 27 of the second RESTATEMENT offers the following guidance 
on the “identical issue” problem: 
c. Dimensions of an issue. One of the most difficult problems in the
application of the rule of this Section is to delineate the issue on which 
litigation is, or is not, foreclosed by the prior judgment.  The problem involves 
a balancing of important interests: on the one hand, a desire not to deprive a 
litigant of an adequate day in court; on the other hand, a desire to prevent 
repetitious litigation of what is essentially the same dispute.  When there is a
lack of total identity between the particular matter presented in the second 
action and that presented in the first, there are several factors that should be 
considered in deciding whether for purposes of the rule of this Section the 
“issue” in the two proceedings is the same, for example: Is there a substantial 
overlap between the evidence or argument to be advanced in the second 
proceeding and that advanced in the first?  Does the new evidence or argument 
involve application of the same rule of law as that involved in the prior 
proceeding?  Could pretrial preparation and discovery relating to the matter 
presented in the first action reasonably be expected to have embraced the
matter sought to be presented in the second?  How closely related are the 
claims involved in the two proceedings? . . . 
Sometimes, there is a lack of total identity between the matters involved
in the two proceedings because the events in suit took place at different times. 
In some such instances, the overlap is so substantial that preclusion is plainly 
appropriate . . . . In still other instances, the bearing of the first determination 
is so marginal because of the separation in time and other factors negating any 
similarity that the first judgment may properly be given no effect. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27, cmt. c. (1982). 
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resolved by the court in the prior action or it was not.  The Restatement
succinctly explains that a judgment is not conclusive in a subsequent 
action as to issues “which might have been but were not litigated and 
determined in the prior action.”91  However, the California courts have 
apparently taken a somewhat different approach in defining the “actually
litigated and determined” requirement.  As with the unique primary
rights theory of claim preclusion, the California approach to the 
“actually litigated and determined” requirement introduces uncertainty 
and unpredictability into the issue preclusion analysis. 
1. Sutphin v. Speik: The California Supreme Court Employs        
Overly-Broad Language in Defining the “Actually Litigated and 
Determined” Rule 
The difficulties with the California definition of “actually litigated and 
determined” can be traced directly to the California Supreme Court’s
 91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27, cmt. e (1982). Comments d and
e provide the following additional explanation regarding when an issue is or is not
actually litigated: 
d. When an issue is actually litigated.  When an issue is properly raised, 
by the pleadings or otherwise, and is submitted for determination, and is 
determined, the issue is actually litigated within the meaning of this Section.
An issue may be submitted and determined on a motion to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim, a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a motion for summary
judgment . . . , a motion for directed verdict, or their equivalents, as well as on
a judgment entered on a verdict.  A determination may be based on a failure of 
pleading or of proof as well as on the sustaining of the burden of proof. 
. . . .
e. Issues not actually litigated. A judgment is not conclusive in a
subsequent action as to issues which might have been but were not litigated
and determined in the prior action.  There are many reasons why a party may
choose not to raise an issue, or to contest an assertion, in a particular
action. . . .  The interests of conserving judicial resources, of maintaining 
consistency, and of avoiding oppression or harassment of the adverse party are 
less compelling when the issue on which preclusion is sought has not actually
been litigated before.  And if preclusive effect were given to issues not 
litigated, the result might serve to discourage compromise, to decrease the 
likelihood that the issues in an action would be narrowed by stipulation, and
thus to intensify litigation.
It is true that it is sometimes difficult to determine whether an issue was 
actually litigated; even if it was not litigated, the party’s reasons for not 
litigating in the prior action may be such that preclusion would be appropriate. 
But the policy considerations outlined above weigh strongly in favor of
nonpreclusion, and it is in the interest of predictability and simplicity for such
a result to obtain uniformly. 
Id. at cmts. d, e.
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1940 opinion in Sutphin v. Speik.92 Sutphin involved two actions to
recover royalties due under an assignment of a participating royalty 
interest in an oil and gas lease. One Cole leased two small lots in
Huntington Beach, and assigned to plaintiff Sutphin a participating 
royalty interest of five per cent (5%) of the total production of all oil and 
gas sold from the existing or any substitute well on the property.  Cole 
subsequently assigned his entire leasehold interest to defendant Speik. 
At the time of the assignment to plaintiff Sutphin in 1927, a well
designated as #3 was being drilled, which later went into production. In
1932, well #3 was destroyed by fire, and defendant drilled another well 
(#3A) in its place, using the original hole and casing, and a second well
(#4) some fifty feet away. 
Plaintiff Sutphin brought his first action against defendant Speik in
1933 to recover royalties due under his 5% participating royalty interest. 
The trial court found that the plaintiff’s participating royalty interest was 
valid, that defendant had knowledge of the plaintiff’s interest when 
defendant received his assignment, and that well #4 produced from the 
same zone and pool as redrilled well #3.  The court then declared that 
plaintiff Sutphin was the owner of 5% of the total production of oil and
gas sold from the two lots even if more than one well was used on the
premises.  Judgment was rendered in 1934 for plaintiff in the sum of $
6,388.82, and became final after being affirmed on appeal. 
Plaintiff Sutphin filed a second action in 1936 to recover royalties 
accruing after entry of the 1934 judgment, grounded on the rights 
adjudicated by that prior judgment.  Defendant Speik pleaded as his 
chief defense that well #4 does not produce oil from any deposit 
underlying the property but was drilled as a “whipstock well” diagonally 
into oil-producing sands under the Pacific Ocean, more that 2000 feet 
from the property, and that well #4 therefore produces from sands and
oil deposits which do not extend beneath the two lots.  Speik contended 
that plaintiff Sutphin had no interest in either well #3A or #4.  Defendant 
offered to prove that  a royalty was being paid to the State of California 
from the production of the wells in return for permission to produce 
from state lands under the ocean, but the trial court excluded this offered
evidence. The trial court found that wells #3A and #4 produced from the 
same zone and pool, and that it was immaterial whether they were
“whipstock wells” because of the doctrine of res judicata.  The court
rendered judgment for plaintiff Sutphin in the sum of $ 31,932.54, and 
defendant Speik appealed. 
On appeal before the California Supreme Court, Speik first argued (a) 
92. 99 P. 2d 652 (Cal. 1940), reh’g. denied, 101 P.2d 497 (Cal. 1940). 
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that the causes of action in the two lawsuits were different, and the 
judgment in the first is not res judicata on the second; and (b) that the 
issue of ownership of oil or oil rights therein produced from state lands 
by a “whipstock well” was not raised or decided in the first action, and 
was not barred by res judicata. The Court agreed with defendant that the 
severable installments of royalties due gave rise to separate causes of 
action, and that the prior judgment was not a complete bar in the second
action. The Court also recognized, however, that the prior judgment 
operates as a conclusive litigation as to such issues in the second suit as 
were “actually litigated and determined” in the first action.93 
The Supreme Court then addressed the following question: Under
what circumstances is a matter to be deemed decided by a prior
judgment?  “Obviously,” the Court observed, “if a matter was actually
raised by proper pleadings and treated as an issue in the prior case, it is
conclusively determined by the first judgment.”94  But, the Court
reasoned, the issue preclusion rule goes further: 
If the matter was within the scope of the action, related to the subject-matter 
and relevant to the issues, so that it could have been raised, the judgment is
conclusive on it despite the fact that it was not in fact expressly pleaded or
otherwise urged. The reason for this is manifest.  A party cannot by negligence 
or design withhold issues and litigate them in consecutive actions.95  Hence the
rule is that the prior judgment is res judicata on matters which were raised or
could have been raised, on matters litigated or litigable.96 
The Supreme Court then applied this rule to the facts of case.  Because
the defense now raised by defendant Speik, that the wells bottomed on
state land, could have raised in the first action, the court concluded that 
collateral estoppel applied.97  Plaintiff Sutphin was therefore entitled to 
93. Id. at 655 (quoting Todhunter v. Smith, 219 Cal. 690, 695, 28 P.2d 916, 918 
(Cal. 1934)).
94. Id. at 655.
95. Id. (emphasis added).  The Supreme Court reasoned that “an issue may not 
be . . . split into pieces.”  Id. The Sutphin Court quoted from the earlier case of Price v.
Sixth District Agricultural Ass’n., 258 P. 387 (Cal. 1927), in explaining this rule against 
issue-splitting. Sutphin, 99 P.2d at 655. 
96. Id. 5 (emphasis added). 
97. Id. at 656.  Because the defendant knew or should have known of the source of 
the oil produced from wells #3A and #4 in 1932, the court viewed the “whipstock well” 
defense as available to defendant at that time and therefore could have been raised in the 
first action. The court further explained its “could have been raised” language as
follows: 
If the asserted defense has merit, it was as good and available then as now. 
This being so, it can make no difference whether it was actually pleaded, or
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his present judgment without any further consideration of the merits.98 
Defendant Speik petitioned the Supreme Court for a rehearing. 
Defendant challenged portions of the opinion which he interpreted as 
meaning that any issue which could have been raised in the first suit is
collateral estoppel in the second, even though not actually determined in 
the first.99  Speik argued that the 1934 judgment cannot be collateral 
estoppel as to the “new issue of the title to oil from wells bottomed on 
state land, which title was acquired after the conclusion of the first
action.”100  The Court denied defendant’s petition, but rendered an 
additional opinion in an attempt to explain its reasoning.101  The Court
denied that it had extended collateral estoppel to any issue which could 
have been raised in the first suit even though not actually determined. 
Instead, the Court explained that the defendant had not in fact actually 
raised a “new issue” in the second suit.102  The judgment in the first
action, the court explained, awarded plaintiff Sutphin 5% of the total
production from the lots in question whether produced from one or more 
wells, and did not limit the plaintiff to production from wells which 
bottomed under the land.  Defendant’s asserted “new issue,” according 
to the Court, was simply another “legal theory by which the same issue
might be differently decided.”103  The Court concluded by observing that
the defendant should not be permitted to relitigate an issue determined in 
an earlier action “whenever defendant can discover a new theory upon 
which to attack” the prior determination.104 
The Sutphin Court may be viewed as articulating two important 
pronouncements with respect to the “actually litigated and determined” 
criterion. First, the Court’s main opinion suggests that collateral
estoppel precludes relitigation of issues that were “raised or could have 
been raised” in a prior proceeding.  Second, the Court’s supplemental
opinion denying a rehearing explains the distinction between “issues” 
and “theories,” the latter apparently a component of the former. 
Collateral estoppel will not bar a party from raising a new “issue” in a 
subsequent proceeding, but will foreclose a party from merely presenting
whether evidence was introduced thereon or not . . . .  When we say that the
issue could have been raised, we mean that it was relevant to or within the 
scope of the action, and not that it was at the time a defense upon which the 
defendant might prevail. 




101. See id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. (emphasis in original).
104. Id. 
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a new factual or legal “theory” with respect to the same “issue” 
previously litigated.  As discussed below, both pronouncements have 
caused difficulties for courts applying California’s collateral estoppel
doctrine. Likewise, both make the doctrine more complex and less 
predictable. 
2.	 Sutphin’s Definition of Issues “Actually Litigated and Determined” 
Confuses the Claim and Issue Preclusive Effects of a Prior Judgment 
The problem with Sutphin is not so much its conclusion of issue
preclusion, which may be justified as an example of a prior ruling on an 
ultimate fact precluding relitigation of lesser-included evidentiary
facts.105  Rather, the problem with Sutphin is the broad language the
Court employed in reaching its conclusion.106  That language, which
suggests that a judgment is conclusive on issues that were actually raised
or “could have been raised,” is facially inconsistent with other judicial 
definitions of collateral estoppel as well as with that of the second
Restatement upon which the California courts supposedly rely.  For 
105. The second RESTATEMENT, section 27, comment c, provides that the issue on
which litigation is foreclosed may be one of evidentiary fact or of ultimate fact:
An issue on which relitigation is foreclosed may be one of evidentiary fact, of 
“ultimate fact” (i.e., the application of law to fact), or of law.  Thus, for
example, if the party against whom preclusion is sought did in fact litigate an 
issue of ultimate fact and suffered an adverse determination, new evidentiary 
facts may not be brought forward to obtain a different determination of that
ultimate fact.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, § 27, cmt. c (1982).
As an illustration, assume that a plaintiff sought to recover personal injuries for a car 
crash by establishing that the defendant was negligent in driving at an excessive speed.
After trial, the verdict and judgment are for the defendant.  In a subsequent action by
plaintiff against defendant for property damages, the plaintiff will be precluded from 
attempting to again establish defendant’s negligence, whether that assertion of
negligence is based on excessive speed or on some different evidentiary basis.  See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27, cmt. c, illus. 4 (1982). 
106. The Sutphin holding is not necessarily inconsistent with the result that would
be reached if the facts had been analyzed under second RESTATEMENT rules. Indeed, the
second RESTATEMENT utilizes a pared-down version of the facts in Sutphin as one of its 
illustrations regarding the dimension of an “issue,” which the Reporter’s Note to section
27 acknowledges is based on Sutphin v. Speik. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§27, cmt. e, illus. 5 (1982).  The RESTATEMENT does not provide a definitive answer as 
to the proper application of the “identical issue actually litigated and determined” rule to 
these Sutphin-like facts, but advises that preclusion should turn on application of the 
factors described in comment c, “particularly the relation between the evidentiary 
presentation, the applicable rule of law, and the claim involved in each of the two
proceedings.” Id. at § 27, cmt. c, illus. 5.
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example, California Supreme Court decisions repeatedly state that the
issue preclusive effect of a judgment is limited to “issues actually 
litigated” in a prior action.107  Likewise, the Restatement clearly explains
that a “judgment is not conclusive in a subsequent action as to issues 
which might have been but were not litigated and determined in a prior 
action.”108 
A careful reading of Sutphin’s two opinions suggests that the 
offending language applies only to legal “theories” and factual 
“matters,” and not to “issues,” that could have been raised in the prior
action.109  Unfortunately, as discussed in detail in the next section of this
Article, the Sutphin Court’s distinction between “issue” and “theory” is
quite subtle and is difficult to apply.110  Too subtle and difficult, perhaps,
for many of the courts that have applied Sutphin’s reasoning. The courts 
of appeal typically quote the “issues raised or could have been raised” 
language of Sutphin’s main opinion, not the “issues” versus “theories” 
reasoning of the supplemental opinion, when describing the
circumstances in which a matter has been “actually litigated and 
determined” by a prior judgment.111 
107. See, e.g., Lucido v. Superior Court, 795 P.2d 1223, 1225-26 (Cal. 1991)
(stating basic requirement that collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of only those 
issues actually litigated, such as issues actually raised by presentation of evidence and
decided, in a prior proceeding); People v. Sims, 651 P.2d 321, 331 (Cal. 1982) (defining
when an issue is “actually litigated” by reference to comment d to section 27 of the
second RESTATEMENT to mean an issue properly raised by the pleadings or otherwise, 
submitted for determination, and determined); Henn v. Henn, 605 P.2d 10, 13-14 (Cal. 
1980) (ruling that collateral estoppel is limited to issues litigated and determined, and did 
not extend to issues which could have been adjudicated but were not actually raised).
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27, cmt. e (1982). 
109. Several courts have emphasized this “issue\theory” distinction when discussing 
the doctrine of collateral estoppel, often stating some variant of the following 
observation, as made in Lucas v. County of Los Angeles, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 655, 662 (Ct. 
App. 1996): “The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies on issues litigated even though
some factual matters or legal arguments which could have been raised were not.”  See 
e.g., Mobilepark W. Homeowners Ass’n v. Escondido Mobilepark W., 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d
393, 403 (Ct. App. 1995); Branson v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 314, 324
(Ct. App. 1994); Interinsurance Exch. of the Auto. Club v. Superior Court, 257 Cal. Rptr. 
37, 39 (Ct. App. 1989). 
110. Referring to Sutphin’s discussion of this distinction, the Court in Clark v.
Lesher, 299 P.2d 865, 868 (Cal. 1956), remarked that the “actually litigated” rule “is not
an easy rule to apply, for the term ‘issue’ as used in this connection is difficult to
define . . . .”  A more recent decision also echoed this sentiment.  See Wimsatt v. Beverly
Hills Weight Loss Clinics Int’l, Inc., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 612, 615 (Ct. App. 1995)
(observing that the distinction between “issues” and “theories” is not always easy).
111. This language from Sutphin has been quoted extensively and applied by the 
courts of appeal in several recent cases.  See, e.g., Warga v. Cooper, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
684, 688 (Ct. App. 1996); Tensor Group v. City of Glendale, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 642-
43 (Ct. App. 1993); Thibodeau v. Crum, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 27, 29-30 (Ct. App. 1992); 
Interinsurance, 257 Cal.Rptr. at 39.  For citations to additional cases quoting this 
language from Sutphin in the context of claim preclusion, see infra note 114. 
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Although the Court in Sutphin clearly utilized this “issues raised or
could have been raised” language in the context of issue preclusion, this
language is actually more appropriate for a claim preclusion analysis. 
Under the claim preclusion aspect of res judicata, a prior judgment bars 
a second lawsuit on the same cause of action even though the plaintiff is 
prepared in the second action to present different evidence, legal
theories, or grounds for relief than those presented in the first action.112 
In other words, the universally accepted premise of claim preclusion is 
that a prior judgment forecloses relitigation of the same cause of action, 
which in turn precludes relitigation of all issues which were raised or 
could have been raised as components of that cause of action.113  Indeed, 
some of the courts that have quoted the “issues raised or could have been
raised” portion of the Sutphin opinion have done so as part of a claim,
not an issue, preclusion determination.114 
By importing this broad claim preclusion language into its issue 
preclusion analysis, the Supreme Court has confused the preclusive
112. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 25 (1982) and cases cited
in supra note 51. 
113. By employing this broad language, the court in Sutphin confused the 
preclusive effects of claim and issue preclusion.  In Krier v. Krier, 172 P.2d 681 (Cal. 
1946), for example, the California Supreme Court stated the settled rule that “a judgment 
in a prior action between the same parties on the identical cause of action is res judicata,
and a bar to a second suit thereon, not only as to issues actually determined therein but 
also as to issues necessarily involved.” Id. at 682.  And in Panos v. Great W. Packing
Co., 134 P.2d 242 (Cal. 1943), the court stated that a prior judgment is a complete bar to
a second lawsuit on the same cause of action and is deemed to adjudicate, for purposes
of the second action, “not only every matter which was, but also every matter which 
might have been urged in support of the cause of action or claim in litigation.” Id. at 243. 
See also  RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 63 cmt. a (1942); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 25 (1982); note 51 supra, and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 197 Cal. Rptr. 612, 614 (Ct. App. 1983)
(citing Sutphin for the proposition that if the same primary right is involved in two 
actions, the judgment in the first action bars consideration not only of all matters actually 
raised but also all matters which could have been raised); Kronkright v. Gardner, 107
Cal. Rptr. 270 (Ct. App. 1973) (quoting Sutphin and holding that a prior judgment barred 
the instant action because both presented the same claim although sought different forms 
of relief); cf. Henry v. Clifford, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 116, 119 (Ct. App. 1995) (quoting 
Sutphin and holding that prior judgment barred instant action because both involved 
same primary right although different issues of negligence); Takahashi v. Board of 
Education, 249 Cal. Rptr. 578, 589 (Ct. App. 1988) (quoting Sutphin at length in support 
of conclusion that prior mandamus judgment had claim preclusive effect and served “as 
a bar not only to the issues litigated but to those that could have been litigated at the 
same time”); DeHart v. Allen, 161 P.2d 453, 454 (Cal. 1945) (citing Sutphin for the
proposition that a judgment is res judicata as to issues expressly presented or could have 
been raised).
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effects of the two doctrines. The temptation for the court to have done 
this in 1940 is understandable.  At the time of the Sutphin decision,
California utilized the primary rights theory (as it does now) to define a 
cause of action for claim preclusion purposes.  As discussed in Part I of
this Article, that approach sometimes meant that a single wrongful act of 
a defendant would give raise to two or more causes of action.115 
Moreover, California’s then-operative permissive joinder of claims
statute restricted the types of causes of action that could be joined in one
lawsuit to certain categories.116  This combination of narrowly defined
claim preclusion and restricted claim joinder often required a plaintiff to 
pursue multiple lawsuits to seek redress for injuries caused by a
defendant’s single wrongful act.117  Perhaps these inefficiencies induced 
the court in Sutphin to broadly define the issue foreclosed by collateral
estoppel, and to employ the “raised or could have been raised” test for 
issue preclusion, as a counter to the claim preclusion and claim joinder
rules.118  Although the inefficient claim preclusion and claim joinder
doctrines may permit a plaintiff to maintain multiple lawsuits regarding 
the unitary conduct, Sutphin’s issue preclusion rule would prevent the 
plaintiff from raising any new factual or legal matters in the subsequent 
lawsuits.
Most courts utilize this language from Sutphin as it was intended—as
part of a collateral estoppel analysis of whether an issue was “actually
litigated and determined” in a prior proceeding on a different cause of 
action.119  Some of these courts sought to ascertain the preclusive effect 
of a prior judgment by determining whether a particular issue, although
not previously litigated, could have been litigated in the prior 
proceeding.120  Others have applied the rationale of Sutphin’s language 
115. See supra notes 22-48 and accompanying text. 
116. See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text. 
117. See supra notes 24-37 and accompanying text. 
118. This use of collateral estoppel was advocated in Note, Developments in the
Law—Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REV. 818 (1952).  For cases which involve multiple 
causes of action arising from the same transaction, such as automobile accidents, claims
for successive installments on a contract, or periodic claims of rent or interest: “[t]he first
judgment should be conclusive not only as to issues litigated, but also as to issues which
might have been litigated.” Id. at 841. 
119. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 111 and infra note 120. 
120. See, e.g., Neil Norman, Ltd. v. William Kasper & Co., 197 Cal. Rptr. 198 (Ct.
App. 1983); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 180 Cal. Rptr. 244, 247
(Ct. App. 1982) (finding collateral estoppel inapplicable because issue “was neither
litigated nor could it have been raised and litigated” in a prior action between the same
parties on a different cause of action); Kingsbury v. Tevco, Inc., 144 Cal. Rptr. 773, 774-
75 (Ct. App. 1978) (ruling that a prior in boundary line litigation was collateral estoppel 
on issue of improperly conducted court-ordered survey because issue could have been 
brought to the attention of the court in the prior action); Kelley v. Kelley, 141 Cal. Rptr. 
33, 35 (Ct. App. 1977) (holding that prior dissolution of marriage judgment adjudicated 
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to justify the extension of collateral estoppel to a default judgment,121 a 
stipulated judgment,122 or a voluntary dismissal with prejudice.123  Such
community property issues which were raised or could have been raised by the parties),
disapproved by  Henn v. Henn, 605 P.2d 10, 14 n.6 (Cal. 1980); cf. Goldberg v. Frye, 
266 Cal. Rptr. 483 (Ct. App. 1990) (ruling that legatees of estate weere foreclosed from 
seeking damages from estate administrator for fraud because legatees failed to raise issue
of fraud at time of prior final accounting); Interinsurance Exch. of the Auto. Club v. 
Superior Court, 257 Cal. Rptr. 37 (Ct. App. 1989) (finding collateral estoppel applicable
because plaintiff’s “theory” of fraud could have been raised in the prior proceeding).
In Neil Norman, for example, the court determined whether a prior lawsuit between 
the merchant parties for breach of contract for shipment of defective wool sweaters
precluded the instant action for breach of the same contract for shipment of defective 
acrylic sweaters.  The court relied on Sutphin and noted that preclusion occurred in
Sutphin “because the issue in question could have been litigated in the prior action.” Neil 
Norman, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 202 (emphasis added).  The court then concluded that, unlike 
Sutphin, the plaintiff could not have raised the issue of the defective acrylic sweaters
during the first lawsuit because plaintiff could not reasonably have known of the defects 
in the shipped but uninspected acrylic sweaters during the pendency of the first lawsuit.
Id. The court concluded that the plaintiff had not negligently withheld the issue from the
first lawsuit and then attempt to litigate it later. Id. 
121. Some California courts have held that a default judgment has a collateral 
estoppel effect as to material issues raised by the complaint and necessary to uphold the 
default judgment.  See, e.g., English v. English, 70 P.2d 625 (Cal. 1937); Four Star 
Electric Inc. v. Feh Constr., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1 (Ct. App. 1992); County of San Diego v. 
Hotz, 214 Cal. Rptr. 658 (Ct. App. 1985); Mitchell v. Jones, 342 P.2d 503, 506-07 (Cal. 
1959). By contrast, the RESTATEMENT view is that in the case of a judgment entered by
default, none of the issues are actually litigated and therefore the judgment has no
collateral estoppel effect. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27, cmt. e (1982); 
see also infra note 124. 
122. See, e.g., California State Auto. Ass’n Interinsurance Bureau v. Superior 
Court, 788 P.2d 1156, 1159 n.2 (Cal. 1990) (collecting cases and ruling that a stipulated
judgment may properly be given a collateral estoppel effect as to all issues of liability,
unless scope of such issue preclusion restricted by the parties); Wittman v. Chrysler
Corp., 245 Cal. Rptr. 20, 22-24 (Ct. App. 1988) (ruling that consent judgment had
collateral estoppel effect on issues raised in pleadings although abandoned by party); In
re Marriage of Buckley, 184 Cal. Rptr. 290, 294 (Ct. App. 1982) (ruling that a stipulated
judgment determines all matter put into issue by the pleadings, and has a collateral 
estoppel effect on such issues unless the parties agree otherwise); cf., Warga v. Cooper, 
51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 684 (Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Sutphin and holding that stipulated
judgment had a res judicata effect, but not clearly indicating whether applying claim or 
issue preclusion); but see Landeros v. Pankey, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 165 (Ct. App. 1995) 
(relying on comment e to § 27 of the second RESTATEMENT and holding that a stipulated 
judgment in a prior unlawful detainer action did not preclude litigation of habitability
issue in the instant action because the stipulated judgment contained no express language 
manifesting an intention of the parties to preclude litigation of this issue).
The second RESTATEMENT view is that a stipulated judgment by itself has no collateral 
estoppel effect but the parties may intend, by separate agreement, a preclusive effect as
to certain issues. See infra note 124. 
123. See, e.g., Torrey Pines Bank v. Superior Court, 265 Cal. Rptr. 217, 220-224
(Ct. App. 1989) (concluding that a voluntary dismissal with prejudice of a prior action 
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extensions of collateral estoppel are inconsistent with the second
Restatement, which views uncontested judgments as not “actually 
litigating” any issues.124 
3. Sutphin’s Distinction Between “Issues” and “Theories” Is 
Complex, Difficult to Apply, and Unpredictable 
The California Supreme Court in Sutphin, in its supplemental opinion 
denying a rehearing, sought to explain its rule against “issue-splitting” 
by distinguishing between “issues” and “theories,” the latter apparently a
component of the former.  Collateral estoppel will not bar a party from 
raising a new “issue” in a subsequent proceeding, according to the court, 
but will foreclose a party from merely presenting a new factual or legal 
“theory” with respect to the same “issue” previously litigated.125 
Consequently, the Sutphin court’s reasoning hinges on the distinction
between “issues” and “theories.” The problem is that these words have
no universally agreed upon core meaning in the context of collateral
estoppel.126  Whether a party in a second action raises a “new issue” as 
opposed to the “same issue” but presented with a “new theory” depends 
on how broadly or narrowly a court chooses to define an “issue.”  The
Sutphin opinion offers no general, objective guidelines on how to
resolve this complex inquiry.
barred the assertion of affirmative defense which raised the same issues in a subsequent 
action); but see Alhino v. Starr, 169 Cal. Rptr. 136, 144 (Ct. App. 1980) (ruling that a 
dismissal with prejudice of fraud action did not amount to factual determination that 
defendant was not guilty of fraud and therefore inappropriately given collateral estoppel 
effect).
124. See  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27, cmt. e (1982).  Comment e
offers the following explanation as to when issues are not actually litigated:
An issue is not actually litigated if the defendant might have interposed it as an 
affirmative defense but failed to do so; nor is it actually litigated if it is raised
by a material allegation of a party’s pleading but is admitted (explicitly or by
virtue of a failure to deny) in a responsive pleading; nor is it actually litigated
if it is raised in an allegation by one party and is admitted by the other before 
evidence on the issue is adduced at trial; nor is it actually litigated if it is the 
subject of a stipulation between the parties.  A stipulation may, however, be 
binding in a subsequent action between the parties if the parties have
manifested an intention to that effect. . . .
In the case of a judgment entered by confession, consent, or default, none 
of the issues is actually litigated.  Therefore, the rule of this Section does not 
apply with respect to any issue in a subsequent action.  The judgment may be
conclusive, however, with respect to one or more issues, if the parties have
entered an agreement manifesting such an intention.
Id. 
125. Sutphin v. Speik, 99 P.2d 652, 656 (Cal. 1940). 
126. For a more complete discussion of the problems associated with attempts to 
distinguish “issues” from “theories” for purposes of collateral estoppel, see WALTER W.
HEISER, ET AL., CALIFORNIA CIVIL PROCEDURE 445-446, 451(1996). 
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The line between “issues” and “theories” may be difficult to draw in 
some circumstances.  Consider the following hypothetical.  Assume that
the defendant’s large truck crashed into the rear of the plaintiff’s car.
Plaintiff’s car was destroyed, and plaintiff suffered severe personal
injuries. Plaintiff first sued defendant for the property damage, asserting
negligence in operating a truck with defective brakes.  Defendant was 
found not negligent in this regard, and judgment was entered for
defendant. The plaintiff then files a second lawsuit to recover damages 
for personal injuries (a different cause of action) this time asserting two 
counts: (I) defendant was negligent in driving too fast; and (II) defendant 
intentionally battered the plaintiff by running into plaintiff’s car.  Are 
both counts barred by collateral estoppel? 
Although contrary arguments could be made, the adverse 
determination of the issue of defendant’s negligence in the first
judgment would likely preclude relitigation of the negligence issue 
raised in count I of the second action.  The “issue” of defendant’s
negligence is the same in both lawsuits, although the legal and factual 
“theory” of defendant’s negligence has changed.  But what about count
II? Does it raise a different issue? This may depend on how broadly the
issue determined in the first lawsuit is defined.  If the issue previously
determined is viewed broadly as whether the plaintiff’s injury was
caused by wrongful conduct of the defendant, then the intentional tort
count in the second action simply alleges a new theory but the same 
issue. However, if the issue previously determined is viewed more 
narrowly as whether the defendant had engaged in negligent conduct, 
then the intentional tort count does not assert the same issue. The proper 
definition of issue here is not readily apparent; consequently, it is 
difficult to predict the likely resolution of this hypothetical collateral 
estoppel question by a court.  Several actual cases, discussed below, 
demonstrate the unpredictability of the “issue” versus “theory”
distinction. 
In Henn v. Henn,127 for example, the California Supreme Court 
considered the collateral estoppel effect of a prior dissolution of 
marriage judgment on a subsequent action to establish community
property interest in a pension which was not specifically adjudicated in
the final decree of dissolution.  A superior court had entered a final 
judgment in 1971 which awarded Henry and Helen Henn specific items 
127. 605 P.2d 10 (Cal. 1980). 
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of marital property as their separate property.  Neither the pleading nor 
the judgment made any mention of Henry’s retirement pension. 
Although both parties were fully aware of its existence at the time of the 
dissolution proceedings, the parties did not seek, and the court did not 
determine, the community property rights with respect to the pension.  In 
1973, Helen filed a second action to establish her community property
rights in her ex-husband’s pension.  Defendant Henry raised the defense 
of res judicata. The Supreme Court ruled that the claim preclusion 
aspect did not completely bar Helen’s action, and then considered the
effect of the issue preclusion aspect. 
Defendant Henry Henn argued that the issue of Helen’s entitlement to
the assets of the community had been “actually litigated and determined” 
by the prior judgment.  Helen argued that the prior judgment had not 
adjudicated the specific issue of her community property interest in the 
pension.128  The California Supreme Court determined that the “doctrine
of collateral estoppel cannot be stretched to compel” the result urged by
Henry.  The Court explained that: 
[T]he rule prohibiting the raising of any factual or legal contentions which
were not actually asserted but which were within the scope of prior action does
not mean that issues not litigated and determined are binding in a subsequent
proceeding on a new cause of action. Rather, it means that once an issue is
litigated and determined, it is binding in a subsequent action notwithstanding
that a party may have omitted to raise matters for or against it which if asserted
may have produced a different outcome.129 
The Court therefore concluded that the doctrine of collateral estoppel
was not applicable because “Henry failed to demonstrate that Helen is 
relying upon some specific factual or legal contention which would have 
been relevant to the adjudication of the parties’ rights to the property
distributed in the 1971 decree if it had been raised.”130  In other words, 
the specific issue of Helen’s interest in the pension was not “actually 
litigated and determined” by the prior adjudication of the parties’ 
community property rights generally.
In Henn, the California Supreme Court choose to define the “issue” 
actually litigated and determined in the prior dissolution judgment in a 
128. Referring to Sutphin, the Court noted that Henry had not asserted that Helen is 
relying upon some factual or legal theory which was adjudicated in the prior litigation or 
which would have had to have been adjudicated if it had been raised at the time. Henn, 
605 P.2d at 13. Precisely what the Court meant by this is unclear. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. In so ruling, the Court disapproved of Kelley v. Kelley, 141 Cal. Rptr. 33
(Ct. App. 1977), which had held that any judicial division of community property
necessarily precluded the subsequent litigation of community property rights in an asset
known to exist at the time of the earlier proceeding, and which could have been
adjudicated at that time. Henn, 605 P.2d at 13 n. 6. 
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narrow manner so as not to include the parties’ community property
rights in the pension. The Court could have defined the “issue” 
previously litigated as “the division of the community property rights of 
the parties,” of which each specific item of marital property was but a 
sub-issue.131  Either definition would seem to be consistent with the
reasoning of Sutphin. This point is illustrated by the recent court of 
appeal decision, in Marriage of Mason.132 
In Mason, Marjorie and Raymond Mason’s marriage was dissolved by
a judgment entered in 1993.  Prior to this judgment, Majorie had 
operated a residential care facility at home and closed the business due 
to ill health.  The dissolution judgment allocated various amounts of 
marital property to the parties, as well as spousal support.  Subsequently, 
Raymond commenced an attack on the prior judgment, claiming that the 
goodwill component of the business was an “omitted asset”133 and worth
$ 157,000.  The trial court rejected Raymond’s claim on the ground that
the business was a known asset which was divided by the prior 
judgment, and commented that “if [husband] . . . didn’t raise the 
goodwill issue that is his tough luck.”134  The court of appeal affirmed
based on the doctrine of res judicata.  The court observed that a “party
cannot by negligence or design withhold issues and litigate them in 
consecutive actions.”135  The court continued by quoting language from
Sutphin: “Hence the rule is that the prior judgment is res judicata on
matters which were raised or could have been raised, on matters litigated 
or litigable.”136 
131. This was the approach taken by the Court of Appeal in Kelley, 141 Cal. Rptr. 
at 35.  After quoting Sutphin, the court in Kelley concluded that the issue of the Kelleys’
community property interest in retirement pay was adjudicated by the prior dissolution of 
marriage judgment because, although not expressly pleaded, it “could have been raised.” 
Id. This reasoning in Kelley was specifically disapproved by the court in Henn. See 
supra note 130. 
132. 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263 (Ct. App. 1996). 
133. Raymond relied on section 2556 of the CALIFORNIA FAMILY CODE, which 
authorizes a party to a prior dissolution of marriage judgment to file an order to show
cause “in order to obtain adjudication of any community estate asset or liability omitted 
or not adjudicated by the judgment.”  CAL. FAM. CODE § 2556 (Deering 1994).  This 
statutory authority did not exist at the time of the Henn litigation. See In re Marriage of
Umphrey, 267 Cal. Rptr. 218, 223-24 (Ct. App. 1990) (discussing history and purpose of
FAMILY CODE § 2556, initially enacted in 1989 and formerly designated CIVIL CODE §
4353).
































If the court in Mason was applying the claim preclusion aspect of res
judicata, its reasoning was certainly correct and not remarkable.137  But 
if it was applying the issue preclusion aspect, as the Henn Court did in a 
similar circumstance, the Mason court’s holding would seem to conflict 
with the holding in Henn. For unlike the view in Henn, the specific
community property interest sought to be asserted in Mason—the 
goodwill of the wife’s business—was viewed as merely a component or
sub-issue of the property already distributed by the prior dissolution 
judgment.  In other words, the Mason court’s definition of the “issue” 
actually litigated and determined in the prior action is much broader than 
that of the Henn court.  Yet neither definition appears clearly and 
predictably incompatible with Sutphin’s reasoning. 
Few recent cases demonstrate the unpredictability of the “issue” 
versus “theory” distinction better than the 1995 decision in Wimsatt v. 
Beverly Hills Weight Loss Clinics International, Inc.138 The plaintiffs in 
Wimsatt were franchisees who first filed an action in a federal district 
court in California against the defendant franchisor, alleging false 
promises induced them to enter into the franchise contract. The 
defendant moved to dismiss for improper venue, seeking to enforce a
forum selection clause in the franchise contract which required suit be 
brought in Virginia.  The federal court found the clause was “valid and 
enforceable,” and granted defendant’s motion.  Plaintiffs then filed a 
second action, this time in state court, and defendant again invoked the 
forum selection clause through a motion to dismiss for improper venue. 
The plaintiffs argued that the clause was invalid and unenforceable due
to the antiwaiver provisions of California’s Franchise Investment Law. 
The superior court found that the issue of the validity and enforceability
of the forum selection clause had been fully litigated in the prior federal
court action, and that plaintiffs were barred by collateral estoppel from
relitigating that issue. Plaintiffs appealed. 
The court of appeal in Wimsatt held that the plaintiffs were not 
foreclosed by collateral estoppel from relitigating the validity and 
enforceability of the forum selection clause, and reversed.  The court 
stated that collateral estoppel is confined to identical issues actually
litigated, but was inapplicable where the previous decision rests on a 
137. The Mason court did not clearly state which aspect of res judicata it was
applying.  Raymond Mason had filed a motion to set aside the stipulated judgment on the 
ground that Marjorie had concealed income and was reopening her care facility. This 
motion was denied by the superior court and affirmed on appeal. Id. at 264.  This could 
constitute claim preclusion.  Nevertheless, the Mason court’s treatment of Raymond’s 
“omitted asset” argument as a new “theory” and as a matter which “could have been 
raised,” suggests issue preclusion. See id. 
138. 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 612 (Ct. App. 1995). 
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“different factual and legal foundation” than the issue sought to be 
litigated in the case at bar.139  “Of course,” the court noted, “in 
determining whether the identity requirement is satisfied, courts must be
mindful of the need to distinguish ‘issues’ from ‘theories.’”140 
The Wimsatt court then examined the exact “issue” previously decided 
by the federal court and the “factual and legal foundation” of the prior 
decision, and adopted a narrow view.  “Styling that issue as whether the 
forum selection clause was ‘valid and enforceable,’” the court ruled, “is
unreasonably broad.”141  Instead, the court viewed the issue previously 
decided as limited to a determination that the forum selection clause was
“valid and enforceable” under federal procedural law, but did not 
determine whether the clause was “valid and enforceable” under state 
substantive law.142  Consequently, because the federal court did not
actually determine the identical issue now presented, the Wimsatt court 
concluded that the prior federal court ruling did not collaterally estop the 
plaintiffs from again challenging the validity of the forum selection
clause, this time under state law.143 
The Wimsatt court’s analysis graphically illustrates the 
unpredictability of the Sutphin’s distinction between “issues” and 
“theories.”  The court in Wimsatt could easily have viewed the plaintiffs 
in the state court action as raising the same “issue” (i.e., the validity and 
enforceability of the forum selection clause) as was actually determined 
in prior federal court action, and as merely presenting a new legal 
“theory” (i.e., state franchise law as opposed to federal procedural law) 
by which the same “issue” might be decided differently.  The court
could then have viewed the plaintiffs’ state franchise law argument as a
legal “theory” or matter which could, and probably should, have been
raised in the prior federal lawsuit in support of plaintiffs’ argument there 
on the “issue” of the validity of the forum selection clause.144  If the
139. Id. at 615.
140. Id. The court also noted that this distinction “is not always easy,” and “the 
best solution to the problem of making this distinction is to give the idea of ‘issue’ a 
‘reasonable meaning.’” Id. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 616-17. 
143. See id. at 619. 
144. A careful reading of the Wimsatt opinion suggests that the court may have 
viewed the question of the validity of the forum selection clause under the California 
Franchise Investment Law as a legal theory which could not have been raised in the prior 
federal court litigation.  The Wimsatt court’s understanding of the federal district court’s 
order seems to be that the federal court viewed the state substantive law question as
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Wimsatt court had applied the “issue\theory” distinction in that manner 
and had found that the plaintiffs were barred by collateral estoppel from 
relitigating the same “issue,” the court’s conclusion would certainly have 
been consistent with Sutphin’s analysis. 
However, the Wimsatt court did not find the same “issue” was
involved in the two actions, and therefore ruled collateral estoppel 
inapplicable. Yet this conclusion seems unobjectionable and no less 
consistent with Supthin than the contrary conclusion.  How can this be?
Because the “issue\theory” distinction is so vague and malleable that it
can justify either result! In other words, this aspect of the “identical-
issue-actually-litigated-and-determined” rule is unpredictable.  Under 
such circumstances, what the Wimsatt court actually concluded was fair 
and appropriate. In cases where the application of collateral estoppel is 
unpredictable, a court should apply the doctrine in an underinclusive 
manner.145  A court in such cases should not invoke preclusion so as to
deprive the litigant of one fair and full opportunity to be heard on an
issue.146 
Three additional cases applying the Sutphin rationale to similar fact 
situations—Corral v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,147 
Rios v. Allstate Insurance Co.,148  and Interinsurance Exchange of the
Automobile Club v. Superior Court149 —illustrate the uncertainty and 
unpredictability of the “issues” versus “theories” distinction as well as 
the “raised or could have been raised” test.  All three cases involved car
crashes and bad faith claims against the plaintiff’s insurer. 
In Corral, the court considered the question of whether a prior 
irrelevant to the federal venue question.  However, nothing prevented the plaintiff from 
raising this state substantive law theory of invalidity in the federal court; and the federal 
court certainly could have entertained this legal theory even if the court ultimately
rejected it. See Walter W. Heiser, Forum Selection Clauses in Federal Courts:
Limitations on Enforcement After Stewart and Carnival Cruise, 45 FLA. L. REV. 553, 
574-582 (1993) (discussing the appropriate role of state contract law when a federal 
court determines the validity and enforceability of a forum selection clause).  If the 
plaintiff believed that the federal court gave insufficient weight to the anti-waiver
provision of the California Franchise Investment Law, the proper avenue by which 
plaintiff could challenge this ruling should have been an appeal and not a collateral 
attack.
145. See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text. 
146. Fundamental fairness dictates that issue preclusion be inapplicable unless the 
party against whom preclusion is sought has had one opportunity to fully and fairly
litigate the issue. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.  Also, as discussed in 
Part I of this Article, concerns for efficiency as well as fairness counsel against over-
inclusion in the application of collateral estoppel. See supra notes 11-19 and
accompanying text.
147. 155 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Ct. App. 1979). 
148. 137 Cal. Rptr. 441 (Ct. App. 1977). 
149. 257 Cal. Rptr. 37 (Ct. App. 1989). 
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arbitration proceeding, instituted by the plaintiff insureds to recover
benefits from defendant insurer under an uninsured motorist provision of 
an insurance policy, had a collateral estoppel effect on the plaintiffs 
subsequent action against the defendant for bad faith and fraud.  The 
arbitrator had found that the driver of the other car involved in the 
collision was insured and that therefore the plaintiffs were not entitled to 
recover under the uninsured motorist provision.  The plaintiffs then
commenced a second action against the defendant insurance company 
for bad faith and fraud, alleging that the defendant had withheld certain
evidence of the other driver’s lack of insurance during the arbitration.
The defendant insurance company raised the defense of collateral
estoppel. 
The court in Corral found that the issue of fraud and bad faith was not 
the same as the issues raised and determined in the prior arbitration 
proceeding, and therefore the arbitration decision did not have a
collateral estoppel effect on the instant action.  In so holding, the court in
Corral declined to follow the decision in Rios, a prior case involving a 
remarkably similar fact situation.  In Rios, as in Corral, the plaintiff 
insured had sought to establish through arbitration that the driver of the 
other car was uninsured and to collect benefits under the uninsured 
motorist provision of his policy with the defendant, but was unsuccessful
in the arbitration proceeding.  The plaintiff in Rios subsequently brought 
a second lawsuit against the defendant insurance company for bad faith
and fraud, alleging that the defendant had introduced perjured testimony
during the arbitration proceeding. The court in Rios concluded that 
collateral estoppel barred the second action against the defendant 
insurance company because the issues of bad faith and fraud by the
insurance company could have been pursued in a motion to vacate the
arbitration decision. 
The Corral court refused to follow Rios, viewing Rios as an improper
extension of collateral estoppel to issues that could have been but were 
not actually raised.150  The  Corral court noted that issues must be 
distinguished from factual matters or legal theories which could have 
been presented but were not, citing Sutphin.151  However, the Corral 
court viewed the plaintiffs’ allegations of bad faith and fraud on the part 



































of the defendant insurance company as new “issues,” not “theories.”152 
By contrast, the Rios court apparently viewed the allegations of bad faith
and fraud there as simply new theories, or perhaps even as new issues,
which could have been raised in the prior proceeding and therefore as
consequently barred. 
In Interinsurance, plaintiff Packham was an insured of the defendant
Automobile Club and was involved in an auto collision with one
Belluni, another driver who was also insured by the defendant Auto
Club. Packham had signed a release, tendered by the defendant, of all 
claims connected with the collision.  After Packham signed the release,
the defendant refused to renew Packham’s insurance.  Packham then
sued Belluni for damages for negligence, and Belluni moved for 
summary judgment based on the release.  Packham argued that she was
confused when she signed the release and had not in reality assented to
the provisions in the release.  The trial court granted summary judgment
for Belluni, which was affirmed on appeal. 
Plaintiff Packham then sued the defendant Auto Club for breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, alleging fraud and overreaching 
by the defendant with respect to the release.  The defendant Auto Club 
argued that the plaintiff’s action was barred by collateral estoppel, and
the court of appeal agreed.153  After quoting Sutphin’s language at 
length, the court in Interinsurance determined that the issue actually
litigated in the first lawsuit was whether plaintiff Peckham had 
effectively assented to the release.  The court concluded that the prior
judgment foreclosed the instant bad faith action because both involved 
the same issue, although the plaintiff was using different legal theories 
(fraud and overreaching) in the instant action.  The court reasoned that 
these theories could have been raised in the prior summary judgment
litigation, and in fact that the plaintiff did raise them on appeal from the 
summary judgment although the appellate court declined to consider
them because Packham had not raised them in the trial. The
Interinsurance court also noted that its reference to plaintiff’s fraud and
overreaching theories as “issues” in its prior opinion did not make these
theories “issues” for purposes of the instant appeal and collateral
estoppel.154 
A dissenting opinion in Interinsurance argued that collateral estoppel 
was inapplicable.155  The dissent agreed with the distinction between 




Interinsurance, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 39-40. 
Id. at 40 n.2.
155. Id. at 41 (Wiener, J., dissenting). 
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the instant action as not relitigating the same fraud theory that could 
have been raised in the prior action between Packham and Belluni.
Instead, the dissent viewed the instant action as litigating the new 
question of whether the defendant insurance company violated a 
different and enhanced set of fiduciary duties owed by an insurer to an 
insured. This theory, the dissent reasoned, could not have been raised in 
the prior litigation between the two insureds.  Moreover, the dissent 
noted, where there is some doubt as to whether the theory could have 
been raised, the court should err on the side of giving the plaintiff her 
day in court.156 
These three cases further illustrate the difficulties encountered by the 
courts in applying both pronouncements from Sutphin. Corral and Rios
take different views of what is an “issue” as opposed to a “theory.” 
Moreover, Rios may be read as an application of Sutphin’s language 
extending collateral estoppel to issues that could have been raised in the 
prior proceeding. Interinsurance illustrates that the distinction between
“issues” and “theories” may cause courts to focus on the wrong inquiry. 
The proper inquiry, according to the dissent in Interinsurance, is 
whether the new “theory” could have been raised, and was relevant to, 
the prior proceeding.  The dissent’s analysis seems persuasive, but adds
more complexity to the issue preclusion determination.  The dissent in 
Interinsurance does provide some worthwhile and simple advice: When
the application of collateral estoppel is not clear, the court should err on 
the side of underinclusion.157  Concerns for basic fairness and efficient 
judicial administration, not to mention the due process right to an
opportunity to be heard on the merits, would seem to dictate an
underinclusive approach to collateral estoppel when its application is 
unpredictable.158 
III. CONCLUSION
A. The California Supreme Court Should Disapprove Sutphin’s 

Rhetoric and Reaffirm Reliance on the Second Restatement
 
Whether the holding in Sutphin was correct or not, the language of the 
156.
157.
 See id. at 43 (Wiener J., dissenting). 
 See id. 
158. See supra notes 11-19 and accompanying text. 
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Sutphin test has made California’s issue preclusion doctrine confusing 
and unpredictable.  Confusing because the Sutphin approach, on its face, 
is inconsistent with other California Supreme Court pronouncements 
regarding collateral estoppel, as well as with section 27 of the second 
Restatement standard upon which the California courts supposedly rely. 
Unpredictable because litigants cannot be sure whether a court will 
apply a broad or narrow definition of “issue”, nor whether a court will 
extend collateral estoppel to issues that were not actually raised but
could have been raised in the prior proceeding. 
The California Supreme Court should revisit Sutphin and disapprove
of the overly broad rhetoric employed in that 1940 opinion.  Arguably, 
the Court has already done so through its more recent, and more 
carefully crafted, opinions defining collateral estoppel by reference to
the second Restatement. However, because the language of Sutphin
retains surprising vitality nearly 60 years later, the Court should clearly
state what it means when it refers to the second Restatement and the
requirement that an issue has been “actually litigated and determined.” 
If the Court means the definition to be that of section 27 of the second
Restatement, as explained by comments d and e, the Court should clearly
say so and disown the contrary language of its Sutphin opinion.
Concomitantly, if the California Supreme Court really intends that 
California’s collateral estoppel doctrine is that of the second 
Restatement, then the court should also disapprove of those decisions 
that have extended collateral estoppel to default judgments, stipulated
judgments, and voluntary dismissals with prejudice.159 
Formal adoption of the second Restatement as California’s collateral
estoppel doctrine and disapproval of the overly broad language in 
Sutphin should make California issue preclusion doctrine more 
predictable. Courts will still encounter difficult questions of whether the 
“identical issue” is involved in two proceedings. Indeed, the 
Restatement acknowledges that determining the dimension of an “issue” 
is often difficult.160  Faithful adherence to the second Restatement will 
not necessarily eliminated use of the “issue” versus “theory” distinction. 
As previously noted, that distinction appears to be consistent with the 
second Restatement’s observation that prior adjudication of an ultimate 
fact precludes relitigation of the evidentiary facts and theories which 
comprise the ultimate fact.161  When used in that sense and applied in 
cases where the distinction between an ultimate fact and its lesser-
159. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text. 
160. See  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. c (1982), reproduced 
supra note 90. 
161. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
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included components are clear, the “fact\theory” dichotomy is 
unobjectionable. 
However, as the several cases discussed above demonstrate, the 
“issue\theory” distinction can be very complex and unpredictable in less 
clear applications. The proper approach to the difficulty of applying this 
distinction in such circumstances is relatively simple. As the
Restatement162 and the dissent in Interinsurance advise, and the holdings
in Henn and Wimsatt illustrate, when the proper application of the 
“issue\theory” distinction is unclear, the courts should err on the side of 
underinclusion and find issue preclusion inappropriate. An 
underinclusive approach in such circumstances not only safeguards a 
party’s right to a full and fair hearing, but also conserves judicial and 
litigant resources which otherwise would be expended in the resolution 
of close questions of issue preclusion.163 
The burden of proof is on the party asserting collateral estoppel to 
establish that the issue was actually litigated and determined in the prior 
action. 164  Consequently, a court may decide that issue preclusion is
unavailable unless the party asserting it can prove that the issue
previously litigated is the same as the issue raised now, or, in appropriate
circumstances, that the issue previously litigated clearly encompassed
the legal or factual “theory” now presented in the instant action.165  In  
this manner, the desired underinclusive result may be achieved through
use of the burden of proof as opposed to some new doctrinal standard or 
rule. 
162. The second restatement explanations of when issues are and are not “actually
litigated and determined” counsel that the interests of predictability, uniformity, 
simplicity, and fairness weigh strongly in favor of non-preclusion in unclear cases.  See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 intro. note, cmts. c & e (1982). 
163. See supra notes 11-19 and accompanying text. 
164. See, e.g., Vella v. Hudgins, 572 P.2d 28, 31 (Cal. 1977); Barker v. Hull, 236 
Cal. Rptr. 285, 288-89 (Ct. App. 1987). 
165. In Jackson v. City of Sacramento, 172 Cal. Rptr. 826 (Ct. App. 1981), the court 
utilized this burden of proof in a analogous situation to find collateral estoppel 
inapplicable.  The court in Jackson concluded that the plaintiff city employee had failed
to meet his burden of proof in establishing that the issue of whether his injury was work
related, as determined in a prior workers’ compensation hearing decision, was identical
to the issue of his disability for purposes of the defendant city’s retirement program.  Id. 
at 828. See also Vella, 572 P.2d at 31 (holding that defendant had failed to sustain burden
of proving requirements of collateral estoppel applicable to prior unlawful detainer
judgment). 
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B. Adoption of the Second Restatement as California’s Claim 





More faithful adherence to the second Restatement by the California 
Supreme Court should improve the predictability of California’s issue 
preclusion doctrine.  Additional improvement may also result from 
changes in California’s claim preclusion doctrine. In a related article in 
this issue, Professor Heiser recommends that the California Supreme
Court should replace the primary rights theory with the second
Restatement as California’s claim preclusion doctrine.166  This  
recommendation is based on the substantive and administrative 
inefficiencies of the current primary rights definition of the “cause of 
action” (or “claim”) foreclosed by a prior judgment.167 
The Introductory Note to the second Restatement’s sections on issue 
preclusion makes the following observation:
There is a close relationship between the definition of a “claim” and the
sweep of the rule of issue preclusion.  Courts laboring under a narrow view of
the dimensions of a claim may on occasion have expanded concepts of issue 
preclusion in order to avoid relitigation of what is essentially the same dispute.
Under a transaction approach to the concept of a claim, on the other hand, there 
is less need to rely on issue preclusion to put an end to the litigation of a 
particular controversy. 168 
The Restatement’s observation may well have been directed at 
California’s narrow definition of a “claim” and, at times, overly-broad
definition of “issue.” Adoption of the Restatement’s transactional 
approach to claim preclusion, an approach that is more inclusive and 
predictable than the primary rights approach, may diminish the 
perceived (and understandable) need on the part of the courts to rely on
collateral estoppel to achieve substantive economies.
166. See Heiser, Res Judicata, supra note 4.
167. See id.; see also authorities cited supra note 10. 
168. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § intro. Note (1982). 
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